Rhetoric

​The species of rhetoric are three in number; for just so many are the hearers of the speeches. For a speech is composed of three things: the speaker, the subject about which he speaks, and the audience, and the end is directed to this last—I mean the hearer.

​And it is necessary for the hearer to be either an observer or a judge, and a judge of either past or future events. The one who judges about future events is the assemblyman, while the one who judges about past events is the judge, and the one who judges about ability is the observer. ​So that of necessity there would be three genera of rhetorical speeches: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic. Of deliberation, one part is exhortation, and the other is dissuasion; for both those who advise privately and those who address the public in common always do one of these. Of judicial pleading, one part is accusation, and the other is defense; for of necessity those who dispute must do one or the other of these. Of the epideictic, one part is praise, and the other is blame.

​And the times proper to each of these are: for the deliberative speaker, the future (for he advises about what is to be, either exhorting or dissuading); for the litigant, the past (for concerning what has been done, one always accuses and the other defends); and for the epideictic speaker, the present is the most critical time (for all praise or blame in accordance with existing circumstances), though they often also make use of other times, recalling past events and anticipating future ones.

​The end of each of these is different, and as there are three classes, so there are three ends: for the deliberative speaker, the advantageous and the harmful; for the one who exhorts advises as for something better, and the one who dissuades dehorts from something worse, and other things— whether just or unjust, honorable or shameful—he takes in addition with reference to this; for litigants, the just and the unjust, and they too take other things in addition with reference to these; for those who praise and blame, the honorable and the shameful, and they too refer other things back to these.

​A sign of this is that the aforementioned is the end for each. For sometimes they would not dispute about other things; for instance, a litigant might argue that a thing did not happen, or that it did no harm, but he would never admit that he is unjust; for if so, there would be no need of a trial. Likewise, deliberative speakers often concede other things, but that they are advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is beneficial, they would never admit; but that it is unjust to enslave neighboring peoples and those who have done no wrong, they often do not care at all. Likewise, those who praise and those who blame do not look to see whether a person has done what is advantageous or harmful, but often, even in praising, they set down that, having disregarded his own advantage, he did what was honorable; for instance, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus, knowing that he must die when it was permitted to him to live. To him, such a death was more honorable, but to live was advantageous.

​It is clear from what has been said that it is necessary to have premises about these matters first; for necessary signs, probabilities, and signs are rhetorical premises. For generally a syllogism is from premises, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the aforementioned premises.

​And since it is impossible for impossible things either to be done or to have been done, but only possible things, and since it is impossible for what has not happened or what will not be to have been done or to be done in the future, it is necessary for the deliberative, the judicial, and the epideictic speaker alike to have premises about the possible and the impossible, and whether a thing has happened or not, and whether it will be or not.

​Furthermore, since all people, whether they praise and blame, or exhort and dehort, or accuse and defend, try to show not only what has been mentioned, but also that the good or the bad, the honorable or the shameful, the just or the unjust, is great or small, speaking either of them by themselves or comparing them with one another, it is clear that they would also need to have premises about greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and particularly; for instance, what is a greater or smaller good, or injustice, or justice; and likewise about other things. Concerning the things, then, about which it is necessary to grasp premises, has been stated; after this, we must divide each of these separately, as for instance, about what matters deliberation is concerned, and about what epideictic speeches are, and thirdly, about what trials are.