Rhetoric

​As for the example, that it is an induction and with what kind of things induction is concerned, has been stated. And it is related neither as part to whole, nor as whole to part, nor as whole to whole, but as part to part, like to like—whenever both are under the same genus, but one is better known than the other, it is an example; for instance, [to show] that Dionysius was plotting for a tyranny when he asked for a guard; for Peisistratus also previously plotted and asked for a guard, and having obtained it, became a tyrant, and Theagenes in Megara did the same; and all others whom people know become examples of Dionysius, about whom they do not yet know whether he is asking for this reason. And all these cases fall under the same universal proposition, that the one who plots for tyranny asks for a guard. So, then, the sources from which what are thought to be demonstrative proofs are spoken, have been stated.

​Now, the greatest difference among enthymemes, and one which has almost entirely escaped the notice of everyone, is the very same one that also concerns the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them are in accordance with rhetoric, just as others are in accordance with the dialectical method of syllogisms, while others are in accordance with other arts and faculties, some of which already exist, and others of which have not yet been systematically grasped. Therefore, they also escape the notice of the audience, and as the speakers touch upon them in the proper way, they transition out of them. But what is being said will become more clear when discussed in greater detail.

​For I call those dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms about which we speak of places (topoi); and these are the ones common to questions of justice, physics, politics, and many other subjects differing in species, such as the place of the more and the less; for it will be no more difficult to syllogize or speak an enthymeme from this concerning justice than concerning physics or anything else whatever, although these differ in species. On the other hand, specifics are those derived from premises concerning each species and genus; for instance, there are premises concerning physics from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism concerning ethics, and other premises concerning ethics from which there will be none concerning physics; and it is likewise in all cases. And those [common places] will not make anyone wise concerning any genus, for they are not about any underlying subject; but as for these [specific places], the better someone selects them, the more they will unconsciously produce a science other than dialectic and rhetoric; for if they encounter first principles, it will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric, but rather that science whose principles they possess.

​And most enthymemes are spoken from these species—that is, the particular and specific ones—and fewer are from the common ones. Just as in the Topics, then, here too we must distinguish the species and the places from which enthymemes are to be taken. And I call species the premises specific to each genus, and places those common to all alike. First, then, let us speak about the species; and let us first grasp the genera of rhetoric, so that having divided how many they are, we may grasp their elements and premises separately for each.