- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:1.14.1-1.14.7
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-26
Various criteria for measuring the gravity of an unjust act are presented, such as the magnitude of intent, damage, incurability, social or moral impact, and violation of unwritten laws.
ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδικίας· διὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὃ Μελανώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει,1 ὅτι παρελογίσατο τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει·2 ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν. ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μεῖζον, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται.
An unjust act is greater in proportion to the greatness of the injustice from which it proceeds; for this reason, the smallest things are the greatest, as in the accusation made by Callistratus, the son of Melanopus, that Melanopus had defrauded the temple-builders of three sacred half-obols; but in the case of justice, the opposite holds. This is because the acts are present potentially; for he who has stolen three sacred half-obols would commit any injustice whatsoever. Sometimes, indeed, the greater is judged in this way, and at other times by the extent of the damage.
καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴση τιμωρία, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴασις· χαλεπὸν γὰρ †καὶ ἀδύνατον†. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις καὶ ἴασις.
Also, when there is no equal punishment for it, but every punishment is less. And when there is no cure; for it is difficult or impossible. And when the victim cannot obtain justice; for it is incurable, since justice and punishment are the cure.
καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγορῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν.3
And if the victim who has suffered the injustice has severely punished himself; for the perpetrator deserves to be punished with a still greater penalty, as Sophocles said when advocating on behalf of Euctemon, who had slit his own throat after being insulted, that he would not assess the penalty at less than what the victim had assessed for himself.
καὶ ὃ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετʼ ὀλίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνειν. καὶ διʼ ὃ ἂν ζητηθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει ζημιοῦται διʼ ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ διʼ οὓς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη.
And what a person has done alone, or first, or with few others. And to commit the same error repeatedly. And that because of which preventive and punishing measures have been sought and found, as in Argos, where a person is punished because of whom a law was enacted, or because of whom the prison was built.
καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μεῖζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνῄρηκεν ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὅρκους, δεξιάς, πίστεις, ἐπιγαμίας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή.
And the more brutal unjust act is greater. And that which is more premeditated. And that which those who hear of it fear rather than pity. And rhetorical arguments are of this kind: that he has abolished or transgressed many things, such as oaths, handshakes, pledges, and rights of intermarriage; for this is an excess of many injustices.
καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὗ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδομαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσαιεν, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφʼ οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ.
And to commit injustice in the very place where wrongdoers are punished, which is what false witnesses do; for where would they not commit injustice, if indeed they do so even in court? And in matters which cause the greatest shame. And if one wrongs the person from whom he has received benefits; for he commits more injustice, both because he does harm and because he does not return good.
καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ διʼ ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι· τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δʼ ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ ἀζήμια ἀδικήσειεν ἄν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἴρηται.
And that which is contrary to the unwritten laws of justice; for it is better to be just not from necessity; now written laws are from necessity, but unwritten laws are not. But from another point of view, if it is contrary to the written laws; for he who commits injustice in things that are fearsome and punishable would also commit injustice in things that are free from punishment. Concerning the greater and lesser unjust act, then, let this be what has been said.
- 1374b25ὃ Μελανώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει
The genitive Μελανώπου is a patronymic genitive modifying the proper name Καλλίστρατος, meaning "Callistratus, the son of Melanopus." Interpreting this as Callistratus accusing Melanopus is incorrect based on Greek naming practices and the context.
- 1374b25ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει
An articular infinitive construction τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν governed by the preposition ἐκ. The dative τῇ δυνάμει functions adverbially ("potentially" or "by implication"), modifying the infinitive to explain that a minor offense contains the potential for committing any injustice.
- 1375a1οὐ τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν
The verb τιμάω (to assess or propose a penalty) here governs the genitive of price/value ἐλάττονος. In the relative clause, the dative ἑαυτῷ is a dative of disadvantage ("for himself"). The contrast shows that since the victim assessed his own life's end, the speaker would not propose a lesser penalty for the offender.