Rhetoric

​All such disputes are about whether an act is unjust and wicked, or not unjust; for wickedness and committing injustice lie in the choice, and such names of acts additionally signify the choice, for instance, insult and theft. For he who strikes does not in all cases insult, but only if he does so for some purpose, such as to disgrace the other person or to please himself. Nor does he who takes something secretly in all cases steal, but only if he does so to the injury of the person from whom he took it and for his own appropriation. And the case is similar for other matters as well as for these.

​Since there were two kinds of right and wrong—for some are written and others unwritten— those about which the laws speak have been discussed, but of the unwritten there are two kinds.

​These are, on the one hand, those which accord with an excess of virtue and vice, on which are directed reproaches and praises, and dishonors, and honors and rewards (such as being grateful to a benefactor, and returning good to one who has done good, and being helpful to one’s friends, and all other such things); and on the other hand, those which are the omission of the particular written law.

​For the equitable seems to be just, and the equitable is just beyond the written law. This happens partly with the consent and partly without the consent of the legislators; without their consent when it escapes their notice, and with their consent when they are unable to define it precisely, but it is necessary to speak universally, though it is not so, but only for the most part; and also whatever is not easy to define because of its infinity, such as wounding with iron, of what size and of what kind; for a lifetime would fail one who tried to enumerate them.

​If, then, a case is indefinite, and it is necessary to legislate, one must speak in absolute terms, so that even if a man wearing a ring raises his hand or strikes, according to the written law he is guilty and commits an injustice, but in truth he does not commit an injustice, and this is the equitable.

​If, then, the equitable is what has been said, it is clear what kinds of things are equitable and not equitable, and what kinds of people are not equitable.

​For those things for which one ought to have sympathy are equitable; and also not to regard errors and injustices as of equal value, nor errors and misfortunes. For misfortunes are all those things that happen contrary to expectation and not from wickedness; errors are all those that do not happen contrary to expectation and not from malice; and injustices are all those that do not happen contrary to expectation and are from malice; for those done from desire are from malice.

​And to be sympathetic to human weaknesses is equitable. And to look not to the law but to the legislator, and not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator, and not to the action but to the choice, ​and not to the part but to the whole, nor what kind of person someone is now, but what kind of person he was always or for the most part. And to remember the good things one has received rather than the bad, and the good things one has received rather than those one has done. And to tolerate being wronged. And to wish to be judged by reason rather than by action. And to prefer to go to arbitration rather than to court;

​for the arbitrator looks to the equitable, but the judge to the law; and for this reason an arbitrator was devised, so that the equitable might prevail. Concerning the equitable, then, let it be defined in this manner.