- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:1.11.1-1.11.8
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Pleasure is defined as a movement of the soul and a rapid restoration to its natural state, followed by an explanation of how habit, the absence of compulsion, appetite, and the sensory faculties of sensation, memory, and expectation bring pleasure.
ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν,1 λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.
Let it be assumed by us, then, that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul and a sudden and perceptible restoration to the pre-existing nature, and pain the opposite.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.
But if pleasure is such a thing, it is clear that also pleasant is that which is productive of the aforementioned disposition, and painful that which is destructive of it or productive of the opposite state.
ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατʼ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις), καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται "πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμʼ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ)," τὰς δʼ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς·2 ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. τὰ δʼ ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.
Therefore, it is necessary that pleasant is both the going into that which is according to nature for the most part, and especially when those things which happen according to nature have recovered their own nature, and also habits (for that which has been habituated already becomes as if it were natural; for habit is something similar to nature, since “many times” is also close to “always,” and nature belongs to “always,” while habit to “many times”). And that which is not forced is also pleasant (for force is contrary to nature, wherefore that which is necessary is painful, and it is rightly said, “for every necessary thing is by nature painful”). On the other hand, cares, serious efforts, and intense exertions are painful; for these are necessary and forced, unless they become habitual; but in this way habit makes them pleasant. And their opposites are pleasant; wherefore ease, freedom from toil, negligence, play, relaxation, and sleep are among pleasant things; for none of these is under necessity.
καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν ὄρεξις. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον ἡ τροφῆς δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος τροφῆς εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν), μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.
And everything in which appetite is present is pleasant; for appetite is a desire for the pleasant. Of appetites, some are irrational and others are with reason. I call irrational those which people desire not from supposing anything (and such are those said to exist by nature, like those existing through the body, such as thirst and hunger for food, and a specific kind of appetite for each kind of food, and those concerning taste, sexual pleasures, and touch in general, and concerning smell, hearing, and sight); and with reason are all those which they desire from being persuaded; for they desire to see and acquire many things after having heard and been persuaded.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις·3
And since enjoying is in the perceiving of some affection, and imagination is a certain weak sensation, there would always follow in the person who remembers and the one who hopes some imagination of what he remembers or hopes. And if this is so, it is clear that pleasures also belong to those who remember and hope, since sensation is also present.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα.
So it is necessary that all pleasant things are either present in perceiving, or past in remembering, or future in hoping; for they perceive present things, remember past things, and hope for future things.
τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται, "ἀλλʼ ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων," καὶ "μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ μνημένος ὅστις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ·"
Now, things remembered are pleasant not only as many as were pleasant in the present when they were present, but also some that were not pleasant, if their subsequent aftermath is beautiful and good; whence also this has been said: “But sweet it is, when saved, to remember pains,” and “For in pains too afterwards a man rejoices, when he remembers as many as he suffered and as many as he did.”
- 1369bκατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν
The prepositional phrase εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν modifies the noun κατάστασις. It is interpreted as 'settling back, transition, or restoration to the pre-existing or original natural state.' The participle ὑπάρχουσαν means 'pre-existing' or 'inherent.'
- 1370a10τὰς δʼ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς
This is part of the accusative and infinitive construction (with εἶναι omitted) dependent on the impersonal ἀνάγκη [ἐστὶ] at the beginning of §1.11.3. The accusative nouns τὰς ἐπιμελείας, etc., function as the subjects, with the accusative adjective λυπηράς as the predicate, meaning '[it is necessary] that care, study, and tension are painful.'
- 1370a30ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις
The conjunction ἐπείπερ introduces a clause where the subject (likely φαντασία, 'imagination/representation') and the verb (ἔστιν) are omitted. It means 'since [imagination is] also a kind of sensation (αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής),' indicating that the representation accompanying memory or hope is the sensory action that makes them pleasant.