Rhetoric

​Yet it happens that to such habits such things follow, and to those of a different kind different things. For instance, immediately perhaps, to the temperate person, because of being temperate, good opinions and desires follow concerning pleasant things, and to the licentious person the opposite concerning these same things.

​Therefore, such classifications must be left aside, but one must examine what kinds of things are accustomed to follow what. For if someone is white or black, or tall or short, no such thing is ordained to follow, but if one is young or old, or just or unjust, it already makes a difference; and in general, all those accompanying circumstances which make the characters of people differ, for instance, whether one thinks oneself rich or poor will make some difference, as will being fortunate or unfortunate. These matters we shall discuss later, but now let us speak first of the remaining things.

​Now, those things happen by chance whose cause is indefinite, and which do not happen for the sake of something, and which happen neither always, nor for the most part, nor in an ordained manner (this is clear from the definition of chance concerning these things); ​and those by nature whose cause is in themselves and ordained; for they turn out in the same way either always or for the most part. As for things contrary to nature, there is no need to examine minutely whether they happen according to nature or through some other cause;

​and chance might also seem to be the cause of such things. And by force are all those things that happen contrary to the appetite or the reasonings of the agents themselves.

​And by habit are all those things which they do because of having done them many times.

​And through reason are those things which seem to be advantageous from among the aforementioned goods, either as an end or as contributing to the end, when they are done because they are advantageous; for even the licentious do some advantageous things, but not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure. And through anger and passion are acts of revenge.

​But revenge and punishment differ; for punishment is for the sake of the one who suffers it, but revenge is for the sake of the one who inflicts it, so that he may be satisfied.

​Now, what anger is will be clear in the section on the emotions. And due to appetite are all those things done which appear pleasant. Also, what is familiar and what has been habitual is among pleasant things; for many things that are not pleasant by nature, once people have been habituated to them, they do with pleasure. So, to speak summarily, all things that they do because of themselves are either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant. And since they do voluntarily all those things which they do because of themselves, and involuntarily those things which they do not because of themselves, all things which they do voluntarily would be either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also place the escape from evils or apparent evils, or the exchange of a greater evil for a lesser one, among goods (for they are in a way desirable), and the escape from painful things or apparent painful things, or the exchange of greater pains for lesser ones, among pleasant things in the same way. Therefore, we must grasp how many and what kind of advantageous and pleasant things there are.

​Now, about the advantageous, it has been spoken of before in the section on deliberative rhetoric, but about the pleasant, let us speak now. And we must consider the definitions to be sufficient if they are neither obscure nor too precise concerning each.