Politics

​among whom the mechanical artisan is included. For this reason, in some states, craftsmen did not share in offices in ancient times, before the extreme democracy came into being. Therefore, the good man, the statesman, and the good citizen should not learn the tasks of those who are thus ruled, except perhaps for his own personal need; for otherwise it no longer happens that the one is master and the other is slave. But there is a certain rule according to which one rules over those who are equal in birth and free. For this we say is political rule, which the ruler must learn by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by being commanded in the cavalry, and to be a general by being commanded as a general, and having served as a colonel and a captain. Therefore, this also is well said, that it is not possible to rule well without having been ruled. And although the virtue of these is different, the good citizen must know and be able both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen, to know the rule over free men in both aspects. And indeed, both belong to the good man, even if the temperance and justice of a ruler are of a different kind. For of a man who is free and yet ruled, the virtue of the good man would clearly not be one—such as justice—but would have different forms according to which he will rule and be ruled, just as the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different. (For a man would seem to be a coward if he were only as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman talkative if she were as modest as the good man; since indeed, the household management of a man and a woman is also different, for the task of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve). But prudence is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler. For the others, it seems, must of necessity be common to both the ruled and the rulers, but prudence is certainly not the virtue of the ruled, but rather true opinion; for the ruled is like a flute-maker, but the ruler is the flute-player who uses it. Whether, therefore, the virtue of a good man and of an excellent citizen is the same or different, and how it is the same and how different, is clear from these things. But concerning the citizen, there still remains one of the difficulties. For is he truly a citizen who has the right to share in office, or are the mechanical artisans also to be set down as citizens? If indeed those who do not share in offices must also be set down as citizens, it is not possible for such virtue to belong to every citizen (for such a person is a citizen); but if no such person is a citizen, in what class must each be placed? For he is neither a resident alien nor a foreigner. Or shall we say that because of this argument no absurdity arises?