- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Politica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:3.1277a
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Aristotle argues that since it is impossible for all citizens to be good men, the virtue of a citizen and that of a good man cannot be simply identical. However, he suggests that for a specific citizen who is a ruler, these two virtues may indeed coincide.
οὐκ ἂν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι1 τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἁπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετήν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου.2 διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δʼ εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ "μή μοι τὰ κόμψʼ ἀλλʼ ὧν πόλει δεῖ," ὡς οὖσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου·3 οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκεῖ που ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα,4 καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερʼ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δʼ εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες· οὗτοι δʼ εἰσίν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοὔνομʼ αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν,
the virtue of a citizen and of a good man would not be one and the same. For that of the excellent citizen must belong to all (for in this way the city must of necessity be best), but that of the good man is impossible, unless it is necessary for all citizens in the excellent city to be good. Further, since the city consists of unlike parts—just as an animal consists immediately of soul and body, and a soul of reason and desire, and a household of man and woman, and property of master and slave—in the same way also a city is composed of all of these, and in addition to these, of other unlike kinds, so it is necessary that the virtue of all the citizens is not one, just as indeed that of the leader of a chorus and of the one standing next to him is not. Therefore, that they are not simply the same is clear from these things. But will there be some person for whom the virtue of an excellent citizen and of an excellent man is the same? Now we say that the excellent ruler is good and prudent, but that the citizen is not of necessity prudent. And indeed some say that the education of a ruler is different from the beginning, just as the sons of kings are seen to be educated in horsemanship and war, and Euripides says: “Give me not clever things, but what a city needs,” as though there were some education peculiar to a ruler. But if the virtue of a good ruler and of a good man is the same, and the one ruled is also a citizen, the virtue of a citizen and of a man would not be simply the same, but yet that of some citizen; for that of a ruler and of a citizen is not the same, and for this reason perhaps Jason said he was hungry when he was not tyrant, as not knowing how to be a private individual. But indeed, to be able both to rule and to be ruled is praised, and the virtue of a citizen seems to be to be able both to rule and to be ruled well. If, then, we set down the virtue of the good man as that of ruling, but that of the citizen as both, they would not both be praised in like manner. Since, therefore, both are sometimes required, and the ruler and the ruled should not learn the same things, but the citizen must know both and share in both, one might see it from this. For there is a masterly rule; and this we say concerns the necessary things, which the ruler need not know how to perform, but rather how to use; and the other part is even slavish. And by “the other” I mean to be able actually to perform the menial actions. But we say there are several kinds of slave; for the types of work are several. One part of these is occupied by the manual laborers, and these are, as indeed their name signifies, those who live from their hands,
- 1277a4εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι
The conditional clause εἰ μή ("unless") limits the preceding adjective ἀδύνατον ("impossible"), establishing the logic that "it is impossible [for all to have the virtue of a good man] unless it is necessary for all citizens in the excellent city to be good."
- 1277a11ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου
The noun ἀρετή ("virtue") is omitted. It should be understood as "just as neither [the virtue] of the leader of the chorus and [that] of the one standing next to him [is the same]."
- 1277a22τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου
An ellipsis of ἡ αὐτή [ἂν εἴη] ("would be the same"). Following οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη ("it would not be simply the same"), it means "but yet [it would be the same as] that of some citizen."
- 1277a29ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα
The apodosis to the temporal/causal ἐπεὶ clause is τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις ("from this one might see"). The particle ποτε introduces a situational limitation ("sometimes" or "at some point").
