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Physics

§3.5#2

Refutation of Infinite Sensible Bodies from Contraries and Place

Aristotle argues that an infinite sensible body cannot exist as a single simple substance, demonstrating this through the mutual destruction of contraries, and further proves using the concept of natural place (topos) that an infinite sensible body, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, is impossible.

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§3.5#2

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι σῶμα ἄπειρον ἐνδέχεται, οὔτε ὡς λέγουσί τινες τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ οὖ ταῦτα γεννῶσιν, οὔθʼ ἁπλῶς. εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι τὸ ἄπειρον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀέρα ἢ ὕδωρ, ὅπως μὴ τἆλλα φθείρηται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου αὐτῶν· ἔχουσι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ ψυχρός, τὸ δʼ ὕδωρ ὑγρόν, τὸ δὲ πῦρ θερμόν· ὧν εἰ ἦν ἓν ἄπειρον, ἔφθαρτο ἂν ἤδη τἆλλα·1 νῦν δʼ ἕτερον εἶναί φασιν ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα. ἀδύνατον δʼ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ὅτι ἄπειρον (περὶ τούτου μὲν γὰρ κοινόν τι λεκτέον ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁμοίως, καὶ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ὁτουοῦν), ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτον σῶμα αἰσθητὸν παρὰ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα· ἅπόντα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστι, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο, ὥστε ἦν ἂν ἐνταῦθα παρὰ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ· φαίνεται δʼ οὐδέν. οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ οὐδʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδὲν ἄπειρον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. ὅλως γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ἄπειρον εἶναί τι αὐτῶν, ἀδύνατον τὸ πᾶν, κἂν πεπερασμένον, ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἕν τι αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ (ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, οἷον ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα οἱ φυσικοί)· πάντα γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον, οἷον ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν. δεῖ δὲ κατὰ παντὸς ἐκ τῶνδε σκοπεῖν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ ὅλως ἀδύνατον εἶναι σῶμα ἄπειρον αἰσθητόν, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πέφυκε γὰρ πᾶν τὸ αἰσθητόν που εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν τόπος τις ἑκάστου, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῦ μορίου καὶ παντός, οἷον ὅλης τε τῆς γῆς καὶ βώλου μιᾶς, καὶ πυρὸς καὶ σπινθῆρος. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ὁμοειδές, ἀκίνητον ἔσται ἢ ἀεὶ οἰσθήσεται· καίτοι ἀδύνατον (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ ὁπουοῦν;2 λέγω δὲ οἷον, εἰ βῶλος εἴη, ποῦ αὕτη κινηθήσεται ἢ ποῦ μενεῖ; ὁ γὰρ τόπος ἄπειρος τοῦ συγγενοῦς αὐτῇ σώματος. πότερον οὖν καθέξει τὸν ὅλον τόπον; καὶ πῶς; τίς οὖν ἢ ποῦ ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς; ἢ πανταχοῦ μενεῖ; οὐ κινηθήσεται ἄρα. ἢ πανταχοῦ κινηθήσεται; οὐκ ἄρα στήσεται)· εἰ δʼ ἀνόμοιον τὸ πᾶν, ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ τόποι· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἓν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς ἀλλʼ ἢ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι· ἔπειτα ἤτοι πεπερασμένα ταῦτʼ ἔσται ἢ ἄπειρα τῶ εἴδει. πεπερασμένα μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε (ἔσται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἄπειρα τὰ δʼ οὔ, εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον, οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ· φθορὰ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς ἐναντίοις). εἰ δʼ ἄπειρα καὶ ἁπλᾶ, καὶ οἱ τόποι ἄπειροι, καὶ ἔσται ἄπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον καὶ πεπερασμένοι οἱ τόποι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ ἀπαρτίζειν τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ σῶμα·3 οὔτε γὰρ ὁ τόπος ὁ πᾶς μείζων ἢ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται τὸ σῶμα εἶναι (ἅμα δʼ οὐδʼ ἄπειρον ἔσται τὸ σῶμα ἔτι), οὔτε τὸ σῶμα μεῖζον ἢ ὁ τόπος· ἢ γὰρ κενὸν ἔσται τι ἢ σῶμα οὐδαμοῦ πεφυκὸς εἶναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾿ οὐθεἰς τὸ ἓν καὶ ἄπειρον πῦρ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ γῆν τῶν φυσιολόγων, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα ἢ τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν, ὅτι τόπος ἑκατέρου δῆλος ἦν διωρισμένος, ταῦτα δʼ ἐπαμφοτερίζει τῷ ἄνω καὶ κάτω.

But indeed, neither is it possible for an infinite body to be one and simple, either in the way some say of that which is besides the elements, from which they generate these, or absolutely. For there are some who make this [besides the elements] the infinite, but not air or water, so that the other things may not be destroyed by their infinite. For they have contrariety toward one another, for instance air is cold, water wet, and fire hot; of which if one were infinite, the others would have been destroyed already. But as it is, they say that that from which these [elements] arise is different. But it is impossible for there to be such a thing, not because it is infinite (for regarding this some common argument must be said similarly for all, both air and water and whatever else), but because there is no such sensible body besides the so-called elements. For all things are resolved into that from which they are, so that it would have been here besides air, fire, earth, and water; but nothing appears. Nor indeed is it possible for fire or any other of the elements to be infinite. For in general, and apart from any of them being infinite, it is impossible for the universe, even if it were finite, either to be or to become one of them, as Heraclitus says that all things at some time become fire (and the same argument holds also for the ‘one’ which the physicists make besides the elements); for all things change from contrary to contrary, for instance from hot to cold. But one must consider in all cases from the following whether it is possible or not possible for it to exist. And that it is absolutely impossible for there to be an infinite sensible body is clear from these: for every sensible thing is by nature somewhere, and there is a certain place for each, and it is the same for the part and for the whole, for instance for the whole earth and for one clod, and for fire and for a spark. Consequently, if it is of uniform kind, it will be either motionless or always in motion; yet this is impossible (for why should it move down rather than up or anywhere else? I mean, for instance, if there were a clod, where will it move or where will it remain? For the place of the body akin to it is infinite. Will it then occupy the whole place? And how? What then or where is its rest and its motion? Or will it remain everywhere? Then it will not move. Or will it move everywhere? Then it will not stop). But if the whole is of non-uniform kind, the places also will be non-uniform. And first, the body of the universe is not one except by contact; next, these will be either finite or infinite in species. Now, they cannot be finite (for some will be infinite and others not, if the universe is infinite, for instance fire or water; and such a state brings destruction to contraries). But if they are infinite and simple, the places also will be infinite, and the elements will be infinite. But if this is impossible, and the places are finite, the whole also must be finite; for it is impossible for place and body not to fit each other exactly. For neither is the total place greater than the body can be (and at the same time the body will no longer be infinite), nor is the body greater than the place; for either there will be a void, or a body which is by nature nowhere. And for this reason, none of the physicists made the one and infinite fire, nor earth, but either water or air or their middle, because the place of each of [fire and earth] was clearly determined, but water and air lean to both directions, both up and down.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 204b25ὧν εἰ ἦν ἓν ἄπειρον, ἔφθαρτο ἂν ἤδη τἆλλα

    A conditional sentence contrary to fact (present or past), using the indicative imperfect in the protasis (ἦν) and ἄν with the indicative aorist/pluperfect in the apodosis (ἔφθαρτο ἂν). It expresses that if one of the elements were infinite (which it is not), the others would already have been destroyed (which they have not been).

  2. 205a10τί γὰρ μᾶλλον κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ ὁπουοῦν;

    An interrogative expression of the 'οὐ μᾶλλον' principle ('no more this than that'), with a verb of motion (such as κινηθήσεται) being omitted. It points out the absurdity that in an infinite space, there is no sufficient reason for a body to move in any one direction (up or down or anywhere else) rather than another, due to the lack of asymmetrical differentiation.

  3. 205a30ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ ἀπαρτίζειν τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ σῶμα

    The impersonal adjective ἀδύνατον is followed by an infinitive phrase negated by μὴ. Literally, 'for it is impossible for place and body not to fit each other exactly (μὴ ἀπαρτίζειν)'. This double negation expresses a strong necessity: place and body must correspond to each other perfectly.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (5, latest 2026-11-04)
  • 2026-11-04 Curator — source 3
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 2
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:3.5#2