- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for failing to distinguish between "matter" and "privation," and argues that matter as the primary underlying subject is itself ungenerated and indestructible.
Ἡμμένοι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν αὐτῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἱκανῶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ᾗ Παρμενίδην ὀρθῶς λέγειν·1 εἶτα φαίνεται αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀριθμῷ μία, καὶ δυνάμει μία μόνον εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον. ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθʼ αὑτήν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς· οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον. ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδεν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ· ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα μοῖρα2 τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ὄντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὁ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. τοῖς δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φθορᾶς. καίτοι οὔτε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ οἷόν τε ἐφίεσθαι τὸ εἶδος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνδεές, οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον (φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία), ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θῆλυ ἄρρενος καὶ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ· πλὴν οὐ καθʼ αὑτὸ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φθείρεται δὲ καὶ γίγνεται ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ. ὡς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, καθʼ αὑτὸ φθείρεται (τὸ γὰρ φθειρόμενον ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ἡ στέρησις· ὡς δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν,3 οὐ καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλʼ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ ἐγίγνετο, ὑποκεῖσθαί τι δεῖ πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ ἐνυπάρχοντος· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, ὥστʼ ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι (λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ, ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· εἴτε φθείρεται, εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίξεται ἔσχατον, ὥστε ἐφθαρμένη ἔσται πρὶν φθαρῆναι. περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀρχῆς, πότερον μία ἢ πολλαὶ καὶ τίς ἢ τίνες εἰσίν, διʼ ἀκριβείας τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐστὶν διορίσαι, ὥστʼ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἀποκείσθω, περὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον δεικνυμένοις ἐροῦμεν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τίνες, καὶ πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, διωρίσθω ἡμῖν οὕτως· πάλιν δʼ ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν.
So others too have indeed touched upon it, but not sufficiently. For first, they agree that something comes to be simply from what is not, in which respect they say Parmenides speaks rightly; then, it appears to them, if indeed [the underlying nature] is numerically one, that it is also only one in potentiality. But this makes the greatest difference. For we say that matter and privation are different, and that of these, one is what is not by accident, namely matter, but the other, privation, is what is not in itself; and the former, matter, is near to being and in a way substance, but the latter [privation] is in no way so. But they make the non-being to be the great and the small alike, whether the combination of both or each of them separately. So that this way of the triad and that one are completely different. For up to this point they did advance, namely that some underlying nature must exist, yet they make this one; for even if someone makes it a dyad, calling it “the great and the small,” he nonetheless does the same thing; for he overlooked the other. For the one which remains is a joint cause with the form of the things that come to be, like a mother; while the other part of the contrariety might often, to someone stretching their mind toward its evil-doing aspect, appear not to exist at all. For, since there is something divine and good and desirable, we say that one thing is contrary to it, while another is that which is of such a nature as to desire and yearn for it in accordance with its own nature. But for them, it turns out that the contrary desires its own destruction. And yet, neither is it possible for the form itself to desire itself because it is not in need, nor for the contrary [to desire it] (for contraries are destructive of each other), but this [which desires it] is matter, just as if the female were to desire the male, and the ugly the beautiful; except that it is not ugly in itself, but by accident, nor female, but by accident. And it [matter] is destroyed and comes to be in one way, but in another way not. For insofar as it is that in which [the privation is], it is destroyed in itself (for that which is destroyed is in this, namely the privation); but insofar as it is in terms of potentiality, it is not destroyed in itself, but it must be indestructible and ungenerated. For if it came to be, some primary thing must underlie it, from which, as an inherent constituent, it comes to be; but this is its very nature, so that it will exist before coming to be (for I call matter the primary underlying subject in each case, from which as an inherent constituent something comes to be, not by accident); and if it is destroyed, it will arrive at this as the ultimate thing, so that it will have been destroyed before being destroyed. But concerning the principle in accordance with form, whether it is one or many, and what or who they are, to determine this with accuracy is the task of first philosophy, so let it be set aside for that occasion, and concerning the natural and destructible forms, we shall speak in what is shown later. That there are, then, principles, and what they are, and how many in number, let it be determined by us in this way; but starting again from another beginning, let us speak.
- 192a2ᾗ Παρμενίδην ὀρθῶς λέγειν
An accusative with infinitive clause introduced by the relative adverb ᾗ ("in which respect"). It indicates the point of agreement where they claim "Parmenides speaks rightly" (i.e., that nothing comes to be from what is).
- 192a14ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα... ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα μοῖρα...
A contrast between principles of different characters. The phrase ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα ("the one which remains") refers to "matter" (ὕλη), while ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ("the other part of the contrariety") refers to "privation" (στέρησις).
- 192a27ὡς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ... ὡς δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν...
Syntactical formulation explaining the dual aspect of matter. The phrase ὡς τὸ ἐν ᾧ ("as that in which [the privation is]") indicates the accidental aspect of matter, while ὡς κατὰ δύναμιν ("as in terms of potentiality") indicates its essential aspect. In the former sense it is destroyed, but in the latter it is indestructible and ungenerated.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (7, latest 2026-11-04)
- 2026-11-04 Reader report (fixed by a curator) — source 1
- 2026-11-04 Curator — source 3
- 2026-10-11 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 2
