← Aristotle

Physics

§1.8

Resolution of the Ancients' Dilemma Regarding Generation

Aristotle presents the difficulty of the ancients who denied coming to be and change altogether, and resolves it by introducing the distinction between 'in itself' and 'by accident' with respect to coming to be. He further points out another path to the solution through the distinction between potentiality and actuality.

View ▾
View
Translation
Typeface
AI ↗
← PrevNext →
§1.8

Ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι1 τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καί φασιν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες οὐδʼ εἶναι πολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ τὸ ὂν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ ὁτιοῦν τόδε γίγνεσθαι, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὐθὲν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι2 ἢ πάσχειν ἢ ἐξ ἰατροῦ εἶναί τι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο διχῶς λέγεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὄντος καὶ τὸ ὂν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. οἰκοδομεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλʼ οἰκοδόμος, καὶ λευκὸς γίγνεται οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλʼ ᾗ μέλας· ἰατρεύει δὲ καὶ ἀνίατρος γίγνεται ᾗ ἰατρός. ἐπεὶ δὲ μάλιστα λέγομεν κυρίως τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἰατροῦ, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰατρὸς ταῦτα πάσχῃ ἢ ποιῇ ἢ γίγνηται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο σημαίνει, τὸ ᾗ μὴ ὄν. ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες ἀπέστησαν,3 καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοσοῦτον προσηγνόησαν, ὥστε μηθὲν οἴεσθαι γίγνεσθαι μηδʼ εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλʼ ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν μηθὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, πὼς μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως, ὅ ἐστι καθʼ αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος γίγνεταί τι· θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαί τι, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος)· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδʼ ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῴου ζῷον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου τι ζῷον· οἷον εἰ κύων ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο. γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῴου, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ζῷον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο εἰ δέ τι μέλλει γίγνεσθαι ζῷον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἐκ ζῴου ἔσται, καὶ εἴ τι ὄν, οὐκ ἐξ ὄντος· οὐδʼ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἴρηται ἡμῖν τί σημαίνει,4 ὅτι ᾗ μὴ ὄν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἅπαν ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν. εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δʼ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται διʼ ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον. ὥσθʼ (ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν) αἱ ἀπορίαι λύονται διʼ ἃς ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀναιροῦσι τῶν εἰρημένων ἔνια· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον καὶ οἱ πρότερον ἐξετράπησαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν καὶ ὅλως μεταβολήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεῖσα ἡ φύσις ἅπασαν ἔλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

​That the difficulty of the ancients is also resolved in this way alone, let us explain next. For those who first sought truth and the nature of things in accordance with philosophy were turned aside, as if pushed by a lack of experience onto some other path, and they say that nothing of existing things either comes to be or is destroyed, because it is necessary for what comes to be to come to be either from what is or from what is not, but from both of these it is impossible ; for neither does what is come to be (for it already is) nor could anything come to be from what is not; for there must be some subject. And thus, by exaggerating the consequence that follows, they say that there is not even a plurality but only what is itself. They, then, adopted this opinion for the reasons mentioned; but we say that to come to be from what is or what is not, or for what is not or what is to act or to be acted upon or to become any ‘this’ whatsoever, is in one way no different from the doctor acting or being acted upon, or something being or coming to be from a doctor. Therefore, since this is spoken of in two ways, it is clear that to come to be from what is, and for what is to act or be acted upon, is also spoken of in two ways. The doctor, then, builds not qua doctor but qua builder, and becomes white not qua doctor but qua black; but he practices medicine and becomes non-doctor qua doctor. And since we say most properly and principally that the doctor acts or is acted upon or that something comes to be from a doctor, when he is acted upon, acts, or comes to be these qua doctor, it is clear that to come to be from what is not also means this: qua what is not. Which those, not having distinguished, shrank from, and through this ignorance they were so far ignorant as to think that nothing else either comes to be or exists, but they did away with all coming to be. But we ourselves also say that nothing comes to be absolutely from what is not, yet in a way it does come to be from what is not, namely by accident (for something comes to be from privation, which is in itself what is not, and not as an inherent constituent; and this is wondered at and seems impossible for something to come to be in this way, from what is not). And in the same way, neither does what is come to be from what is, nor does what is come to be, except by accident; but in this way this also comes to be, in the same way as if animal were to come to be from animal and a certain animal from a certain animal; as if a dog were to come to be from a dog or a horse from a horse. For the dog would come to be not only from a certain animal, but also from animal, but not qua animal; for this already belongs to it. But if something is going to come to be an animal not by accident, it will not be from animal, and if something is going to be what is, it will not be from what is; nor from what is not; for it has been said by us what “from what is not” means, namely, qua what is not. Furthermore, we do not do away with all being or non-being either. This, then, is one way, and another is that it is possible to speak of the same things in terms of potentiality and actuality; but this has been determined with more accuracy in other writings. So that (as we were saying) the difficulties are resolved on account of which they, being compelled, do away with some of the things mentioned; for it is on account of this that those of former times were turned so far aside from the path to coming to be, destruction, and change in general; for this nature, if it had been seen, would have resolved all their ignorance.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 191a8οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι

    The phrase οἱ πρῶτοι (the first) is qualified by the prepositional phrase κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν (according to philosophy), meaning 'the first who pursued philosophy'. The whole noun phrase functions as the subject of the participle ζητοῦντες (seeking).

  2. 191a35ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὐθὲν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι

    The accusative infinitive clause in the main sentence (191a33-35: τὸ ἐξ ὄντος...) is compared with another accusative infinitive clause introduced by the comparative conjunction ἤ (τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν...), mediated by οὐθὲν διαφέρει (differs in no way). ἕνα μὲν τρόπον (in one way) functions as an adverbial accusative.

  3. 191b5ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες ἀπέστησαν

    The neuter singular accusative relative pronoun ὅπερ refers to the distinction just mentioned, namely 'qua...' (ᾗ). It functions as the direct object of the participle διελόντες (not having distinguished), which modifies the main intransitive verb ἀπέστησαν (shrank from, turned away from the inquiry).

  4. 191b20τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἴρηται ἡμῖν τί σημαίνει

    A construction of prolepsis (anticipation). The noun phrase τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, which should logically be the subject within the indirect question clause introduced by τί σημαίνει (what 'from what is not' means), is anticipated and placed before it. The subsequent clause ὅτι ᾗ μὴ ὄν (namely, qua what is not) explains the content of this meaning.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (2, latest 2026-10-13)
  • 2026-10-13 AI review — source 1
  • 2026-10-11 AI review — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.8