- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.6
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Aristotle examines whether the principles are two, three, or more. Based on the arguments that substance cannot be contrary to substance and that contraries cannot act directly on one another, he establishes the necessity of a third underlying nature, proposing three (or potentially two) as the number of principles.
Ἐχόμενον δʼ ἂν εἴη1 λέγειν πότερον δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους εἰσίν. μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε,2 ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὰ ἐναντία, ἀπείρους δʼ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ὂν ἔσται, μία τε ἐναντίωσις ἐν παντὶ γένει ἑνί, ἡ δʼ οὐσία ἕν τι γένος, καὶ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐκ πεπερασμένων, βέλτιον δʼ ἐκ πεπερασμένων, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ἢ ἐξ ἀπείρων· πάντα γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι οἴεται ὅσαπερ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἔτι δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλα ἄλλων πρότερα ἐναντία, καὶ γίγνεται ἕτερα ἐξ ἀλλήλων, οἷον γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ δεῖ μένειν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε μία οὔτε ἄπειροι, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασμέναι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν πυκνότητα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαοῦν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλʼ ἄμφω ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ πλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι κἂν τόδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, εἰ μή τις ἑτέραν ὑποθήσει τοῖς ἐναντίοις φύσιν· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν τἀναντία, τὴν δʼ ἀρχὴν οὐ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαί τινος.3 ἔσται γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχή, καὶ πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου εἶναι. ἔτι οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ· πῶς οὖν ἐκ μὴ οὐσιῶν οὐσία ἂν εἴη; ἢ πῶς ἂν πρότερον μὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη; διόπερ εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ μᾶλλον· πῦρ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ μετʼ ἐναντιοτήτων συμπεπλεγμένα ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγως ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕτερον τούτων ποιοῦντες, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων οἱ ἀέρα· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἥκιστα ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων διαφορὰς αἰσθητάς· ἐχόμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ πάντες γε τὸ ἓν τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις σχηματίζουσιν, πυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅλως ὑπεροχὴ δηλονότι καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. καὶ ἔοικε παλαιά εἶναι καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα, ὅτι τὸ ἓν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσί. πλὴν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι τὰ δύο μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ ἓν πάσχειν, τῶν δʼ ὑστέρων τινὲς τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν ἓν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δύο πάσχειν φασὶ μᾶλλον. τὸ μὲν οὖν τρία φάσκειν4 τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἔκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοποῦσι δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, τὸ δὲ πλείω τριῶν οὐκέτι· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάσχειν ἱκανὸν τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις, δεήσει χωρὶς ἑκατέρᾳ ὑπάρχειν ἑτέραν τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν· εἰ δʼ ἐξ ἀλλήλων δύνανται γεννᾶν δύο οὖσαι, περίεργος ἂν ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν ἐναντιώσεων εἴη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι ἐναντιώσεις τὰς πρώτας. ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἕν τι γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῷ γένει· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ γένει μία ἐναντίωσις ἔστιν, πᾶσαί τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ἓν τὸ στοιχεῖον οὔτε πλείω δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν, φανερόν· τούτων δὲ πότερον, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν ἔχει πολλήν.
Next would be to say whether they are two or three or more. For it is not possible for them to be one, because contraries are not one, nor infinite, because being will not be knowable, and one contrariety belongs to any one genus, and substance is a single genus; and also because it is possible to generate from finite principles, and it is better from finite ones, as Empedocles does, than from infinite ones; for he thinks he accounts for all things that Anaxagoras does from infinite ones. Furthermore, there are contraries prior to others, and they come to be from one another, as sweet and bitter, and white and black, but principles must always remain. That they are, then, neither one nor infinite is clear from these; but since they are finite, not making them only two has some reason. For one might wonder how either density is by nature such as to do something to rarity, or rarity to density. Likewise with any other contrariety; for friendship does not gather strife and make something out of it, nor strife out of friendship, but both do so to some other third thing. And some assume even more things from which they construct the nature of existing things. In addition to these, one might still wonder about this, unless someone assumes another nature underlying the contraries. For we see the substance of none of the existing things to be contraries, and a principle must not be spoken of as belonging to any subject. For there will be a principle of the principle; for the subject is a principle, and seems to be prior to what is predicated of it. Furthermore, we say that substance is not contrary to substance; how then could substance come to be from non-substances? Or how could non-substance be prior to substance? Therefore, if anyone considers both the former argument and this one to be true, it is necessary, if he is to preserve both of them, to assume some third thing, just as those say who say that the universe is some one nature, like water or fire or what is intermediate between them. And the intermediate seems more likely; for fire, earth, air, and water are already entangled with contrarieties. Therefore, not without reason do they act who make the subject other than these, and of the others, those who make it air; for air has the least sensible differences of the others; and next is water. But all shape this one by means of the contraries, by density and rarity, and by the more and less. And these are, in general, clearly excess and defect, just as was said before. And this opinion also seems to be ancient, that the one and excess and defect are principles of existing things. Except not in the same way, but the ancients say that the two act and the one is acted upon, whereas some of the later ones say rather the contrary, that the one acts and the two are acted upon. That, then, asserting that there are three elements, to those who examine from these and other such things, would seem to have some reason, as we said, but more than three no longer. For toward being acted upon, the one is sufficient, but if, there being four, there are to be two contrarieties, each will need to have another intermediate nature separately; but if, being two, they can generate from each other, one of the two contrarieties would be superfluous. At the same time, it is also impossible for there to be more primary contrarieties. For substance is a single genus of being, so that the principles will differ from each other only by prior and posterior, but not in genus; for always in one genus there is one contrariety, and all contrarieties seem to be reduced to one. That, then, the element is neither one nor more than two or three, is clear; but which of these it is, as we said, has much difficulty.
- 189a11Ἐχόμενον δʼ ἂν εἴη
An impersonal construction using the neuter singular present middle/passive participle ἐχόμενον (from ἔχομαι, "to follow" or "be next") with the optative and ἄν (ἂν εἴη), meaning "It would follow next to say...", indicating a logical transition in the argument.
- 189a6μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε
After οὐχ οἷόν τε ("it is not possible"), the infinitive εἶναι (along with "the principles" as its subject) is omitted. The accusatives μίαν and the subsequent ἀπείρους function as the subject accusatives of this omitted infinitive.
- 189a29τὴν δʼ ἀρχὴν οὐ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαί τινος
The preposition κατά with the genitive means "predicated of" or "said of". This clause asserts that "a principle must not be spoken of as belonging to any subject (underlying thing)", meaning that a primary principle must be a fundamental subject (substrate) rather than an attribute of something else.
- 189b17τὸ μὲν οὖν τρία φάσκειν
The definite article τό nominalizes the entire infinitive clause τρία φάσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι, making it the subject of the main optative verb δόξειεν ἂν ("it would seem"). It translates to "to assert that the elements are three would seem...".
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (6, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 3
- 2026-08-29 Reader report (fixed by a curator) — source 1
- 2026-08-28 Reader report (fixed by a curator) — source 1
