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Physics

§1.5

Contraries as Principles of Nature in Early Thought

Aristotle reviews the doctrines of his predecessors, pointing out that all thinkers, including those who posit only a single motionless entity, assume contraries as principles, and argues the rational ground that generation and destruction occur between contraries.

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§1.5

Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν οἵ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἓν τὸ πᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον (καὶ γὰρ Παρμενίδης θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν) καὶ οἱ μανὸν καὶ πυκνόν, καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλῆρες καὶ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὂν τὸ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ὂν εἶναί φησιν· ἔτι θέσει, σχήματι, τάξει. ταῦτα δὲ γένη ἐναντίων· θέσεως ἄνω κάτω, πρόσθεν ὄπισθεν, σχήματος γεγωνιωμένον ἀγώνιον, εὐθὺ περιφερές. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου σκέψασθαι πῶς συμβαίνει. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν μή τις λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο λευκὸν ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ συμβεβηκὸς εἴη τῷ μὴ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ μέλανι τὸ μουσικόν; ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός,1 ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ· ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν εἰς τὸ μὴ μουσικόν, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ σύνθετα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰς ἀντικειμένας διαθέσεις ὠνομάσθαι λανθάνει τοῦτο συμβαῖνον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἡρμοσμένον ἐξ ἀναρμόστου γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον ἐξ ἡρμοσμένου, καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἡρμοσμένον εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. διαφέρει δʼ οὐθὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμονίας εἰπεῖν ἢ τάξεως ἢ συνθέσεως· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἰκία καὶ ἀνδριὰς καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο γίγνεται ὁμοίως· ἥ τε γὰρ οἰκία γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διῃρῆσθαι ταδὶ ὡδί, καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης· καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσίς τίς ἐστιν. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἅπαν ἂν γίγνοιτο τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ φθείροιτο τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ εἰς ἐναντία καὶ τὰ τούτων μεταξύ. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἶον χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· ὥστε πάντʼ ἂν εἴη τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων. μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον· πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπʼ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. διαφέρουσι δʼ ἀλλήλων τῷ τοὺς μὲν πρότερα τοὺς δʼ ὕστερα λαμβάνειν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δʼ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἕτεροι δὲ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν αἰτίας τίθενται τῆς γενέσεως· ταῦτα δʼ ἀλλήλων διαφέρει κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον), ὥστε ταὐτὰ λέγειν πως καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἕτερα μὲν ὥσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις, ταὐτὰ δὲ ἤ ἀνάλογον· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περιέχει, τὰ δὲ περιέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων.2 ταύτη τε δὴ ὡσαύτως λέγουσι καὶ ἑτέρως, καὶ χεῖρον καὶ βέλτιον, καὶ οἱ μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνώριμον, τὸ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τοῦ καθόλου, ἡ δʼ αἴσθησις τοῦ κατὰ μέρος), οἷον τὸ μὲν μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐναντίας δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, φανερόν.

​Indeed, all thinkers make the contraries their principles, both those who say that the All is one and unmoved (for even Parmenides makes hot and cold his principles, which he addresses as fire and earth) and those who assume the rare and the dense, and Democritus the full and the empty, of which he says one exists as being and the other as non-being; and further by position, shape, and order. And these are genera of contraries: of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape, angled and angleless, straight and circular. It is clear, then, that everyone in some way makes the contraries their principles. And this is reasonable; for principles must neither be from one another nor from other things, and from them all things must come; and these conditions belong to the primary contraries: because they are primary, they are not from other things, and because they are contraries, they are not from one another. But we must also consider how this happens in terms of argument. First, then, we must assume that of all things that exist, nothing is by nature such as either to act or to be acted upon, any chance thing by any chance thing, nor does anything come to be from any chance thing, unless one takes it in an accidental sense. For how could white come to be from musical, unless ‘musical’ happened to be an accident of the non-white or the black? But white comes to be from non-white, and of this not from just anything, but from black or the intermediates, and musical not from musical, but not from just anything, but from unmusical or if there is any intermediate between them. Nor indeed does a thing perish into any chance thing first, for example, white not into musical, unless perhaps by accident, but into non-white, and not into just anything, but into black or the intermediate; and in the same way musical into non-musical, and this not into just anything, but into unmusical or if there is any intermediate between them. It is likewise also with other things, since even things that are not simple but composite among existing things follow the same principle; but because the opposite states are not named, this escape notice as happening. For everything that is harmonized must come to be from the unharmonized, and the unharmonized from the harmonized, and the harmonized must perish into disharmony, and this not just any chance disharmony, but the opposite one. And it makes no difference whether we speak of harmony or of order or of composition; for it is clear that the same argument holds. But indeed, a house, a statue, and anything else come to be in a similar way; for the house comes to be from these things not being put together but being divided in such and such a way, and the statue and any shaped thing come to be from shapelessness; and each of these is either an order or some composition. If, then, this is true, everything that comes to be would come to be, and everything that perishes would perish, either from contraries or into contraries and their intermediates. And the intermediates are from the contraries, as colours from white and black; so that all things that come to be by nature would be either contraries or from contraries. Now, up to this point, almost most of the others have gone along with us, as we said before; for all of them, though they posit the elements and what are called principles by them without a rational account, nevertheless speak of the contraries, as if forced by the truth itself. But they differ from one another in that some take prior and others posterior things, and some take things more knowable according to reason, and others according to sensation (for some posit hot and cold, others wet and dry, and others odd and even, or strife and love as the causes of coming to be; and these differ from one another in the manner mentioned), so that they say in a way the same things and yet different things from one another—different, as indeed it seems to most people, but the same or analogous; for they take from the same list of contraries; for some of the contraries contain, and others are contained. In this way, then, they speak both in the same way and differently, and worse and better, and some speak of things more knowable according to reason, as was said before, and others according to sensation (for the universal is knowable according to reason, but the particular according to sensation; for reason is of the universal, and sensation of the particular), as the great and the small are according to reason, and the rare and the dense according to sensation. That, then, the principles must be contraries, is clear.

Syntax notes2 items
  1. 188b1πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός

    The phrase πλὴν εἰ μή serves as a double negative indicating a strong exception: 'except in the case where...' It shows that white cannot perish into musical unless by an accidental concurrence where 'unmusical' happens to possess the attribute 'musical'.

  2. 189a1τὰ μὲν γὰρ περιέχει, τὰ δὲ περιέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων

    This explains the containment relation among contraries: some contraries (more universal ones, like great and small) contain (περιέχει), while others (more specific ones, like rare and dense) are contained (περιέχεται). This accounts for why earlier views, though seemingly different, belong to the same systemic list.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (6, latest 2026-09-22)
  • 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 4
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.5