- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.3#2
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Aristotle argues that "essentially being" is logically divisible into other essential beings, refuting the view that being is a single indivisible. He also criticizes previous philosophers who yielded to eristic arguments by introducing "not-being" or "indivisible magnitudes" to escape Zenonian paradoxes and monism.
ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται1 τὸ ὅπερ ὂν εἰς ὅπερ ὄν τι ἄλλο, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν, οἶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν τι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δίπουν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὄν τι, συμβεβηκότα ἔσται. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ. ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ2 ὑπάρχει τὸ ὧ συμβέβηκεν (οἶον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς ᾗ φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν)· ἔτι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁριστικῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτων οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ὄλου, οἷον ἐν τῷ δίποδι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν, ἀνάγκη χωριστὸν εἶναι αὐτό, ὥστε ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μὴ δίπουν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ δίποδος ἐνέσται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος. ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου3 λόγῳ ἔνεστιν. εἰ δʼ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ὄν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἂν εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἑτέρῳ. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν ἔστω μηδενὶ συμβεβηκός, καὶ καθʼ οὗ ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων λεγέσθω· ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων ἄρα τὸ πᾶν; ἔνιοι δʼ ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι,4 ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι, παρʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἓν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον. τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.
That “essentially being” is divided into something else which is also “essentially being,” is clear also from the definition. For example, if man is “essentially being” something, animal and two-footed must also be “essentially being” something. For if they are not “essentially being” something, they will be accidents. And they must be accidents either to man or to some other subject. But this is impossible. For that is said to be an accident which either can belong and not belong, or in whose definition there is present that to which it is an accident (for example, “sitting” is like the separable kind, while in “snub” there is present the definition of the nose, to which we say snubness is an accident). Furthermore, as for those things which are in the defining formula or of which it consists, the formula of the whole does not inhere in the formula of these parts, for instance, the formula of man in “two-footed”, or the formula of white man in “white”. If, then, these things are so, and “two-footed” is an accident of “man”, it must be separable, so that it would be possible for man not to be two-footed, or the formula of man will be in the formula of two-footed. But this is impossible; for the former is in the formula of the latter. But if “two-footed” and “animal” are accidents of something else, and each is not “essentially being” something, then “man” too would be among the things that are accidents of something else. But let “essentially being” be an accident to nothing, and let that of which both are predicated, and that which is composed of these, be said to be essentially being. Is the universe then composed of indivisibles? Some, however, gave in to both arguments: to the one, that all things are one if “being” signifies one thing, by saying that “not-being” exists; and to the other, from dichotomy, by making magnitudes indivisible. But it is also clear that it is not true that, if “being” signifies one thing and it is not possible for the contradiction to be true at the same time, there will be no “not-being”; for nothing prevents “not-being” from, not being simply, but being some “not-being.” And indeed, to say that, if there is to be nothing else besides “being itself”, all things will be one, is absurd. For who understands “being itself” other than to be “essentially being” something? And if so, nothing nevertheless prevents beings from being many, as has been said. That, therefore, it is impossible for being to be one in this way, is clear.
- 186b14ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται
The ὅτι clause ("that essentially being is divided...") functions as the subject of the predicate καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν ("is clear also from the definition").
- 186b20οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
The relative pronoun οὗ (genitive neuter singular) refers back to the accident and depends on ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ("in the definition of which"). The subject of ὑπάρχει is τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ("that to which it is an accident"), representing the definition of a per se accident (such as "snubness" containing "nose" in its definition).
- 186b29ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου
The reference of the demonstratives ἐκεῖνο and ἐκείνου is crucial: in this context, the part ("two-footed", as a differentia) is contained in the definition of the whole ("man"). Therefore, ἐκεῖνο refers to the part ("two-footed") and ἐκείνου refers to the whole ("man").
- 187a5μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι
This is an infinitive construction governed by the verb κωλύει ("prevents"). The subject of the infinitives is τὸ μὴ ὄν ("not-being"). It distinguishes "being simply" (ἁπλῶς εἶναι) from "being some particular not-being" (μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι).
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (4, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-08-28 Reader report (fixed by a curator) — source 3
