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Physics

§1.3#1

Refutation of Melissus and Parmenides on the Unity of Being

Aristotle refutes the arguments of Melissus and Parmenides that "being is one" by pointing out their logical fallacies and the multi-layered meanings of "being" (essential being vs. accident), showing the contradictions that arise from their premises.

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§1.3#1

Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπιδεικνύουσι, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης μὲν οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον· οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει1 ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης μεταβολῆς. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν; ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἓν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῶ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ πᾶν; ἔπειτα ἀλλοίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι, πλὴν τῷ ἐξ οὗ (οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δʼ οὔ)· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει καὶ τἀναντία ἀλλήλων. καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι· καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδὴς τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται, ψευδὴς μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς, ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν·2 οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ. ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τῷ δεδεγμένῳ. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ χωριστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ᾧ ὑπάρχει. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὔπω συνεώρα. ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθʼ οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν. τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθʼ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσται (ἕτερον γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος)· ἔσται τι ἄρα οὐκ ὄν. οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον. ἀλλʼ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν. εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὄν3 μηδενὶ συμβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνῳ, τί μᾶλλον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δʼ εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν·4 οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν), οὐκ ἄρα ἄν τὸ λευκόν· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ ὅλως μὴ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὄν ἐσήμαινεν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν· πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἔξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν τὸ ὄν· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν μορίων.

​Thus, to those who proceed in this way, it appears impossible for beings to be one, and it is not difficult to solve [their arguments] from the premises by which they demonstrate. For both of them reason eristically, both Melissus and Parmenides. Indeed, that Melissus paralogizes is clear; for he thinks he has assumed that, if everything that has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be does not have one. Furthermore, this also is absurd, to hold that there is a beginning of everything—meaning of the thing and not of the time, and of coming to be not only in the simple sense but also as alteration, as if change does not happen all at once . Next, why is it motionless if it is one? For just as the part, being one—for instance, this water here—moves within itself, why not the whole too? Further, why should there not be alteration? But indeed, neither is it possible for being to be one in form, except in respect of that from which it is made (in which way some of the natural philosophers say it is one, but in that other way they do not); for man is different in form from horse, and contraries are different from one another. And the same mode of argument applies also against Parmenides, even if there are some other arguments peculiar to him; and the solution is in one respect because his premise is false, and in another because his conclusion does not follow; false, on the one hand, insofar as he assumes that ‘being’ is said simply, whereas it is said in many ways; and his conclusion does not follow because, even if only white things were assumed, and ‘white’ signified one thing, white things would nonetheless be many and not one; for the white will be one neither by continuity nor in definition. For to be white and to be that which has received it will be different. And there will not be anything separable apart from the white; for it is not because it is separable, but because to be white and that in which it inheres are different in being. But Parmenides had not yet seen this. Thus, it is necessary to assume not only that ‘being’ signifies one thing, concerning whatever it may be predicated of, but also what is ‘essentially being’ and ‘essentially one’. For an accident is said of some subject , so that that to which being has happened as an accident will not be (for it is other than being); therefore there will be something which is not-being. Therefore, ‘essentially being’ cannot belong to another. For it cannot be that something itself is a being, unless ‘being’ signifies many things in such a way that each is something. But it is assumed that ‘being’ signifies one thing. If, then, ‘essentially being’ is an accident to nothing, but other things are accidents to it, why does ‘essentially being’ signify being any more than not-being? For if ‘essentially being’ is also white, but ‘to be white’ is not ‘essentially being’ (for neither can being belong to it as an accident, since there is no being which is not ‘essentially being’), then the white will not be being; and not in the sense of being some particular not-being, but as totally not-being. Therefore, ‘essentially being’ is not-being; for it is true to say that it is white, but this signified what is not-being. Consequently, even ‘white’ signifies ‘essentially being’; and thus ‘being’ signifies more things than one. Therefore, being will not even have magnitude, if being is ‘essentially being’; for to be is different for each of its parts.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 186a10εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει

    Points out the logical fallacy (denying the antecedent) in Melissus' reasoning. From the conditional premise introduced by εἰ ('if everything that has come to be has a beginning'), he invalidly concludes in the ὅτι clause that 'that which has not come to be does not have a beginning.'

  2. 186a25ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη... οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν

    The adjective ἀσυμπέραντος (inconclusive) is a feminine singular form modifying 'the solution' (ἡ λύσις). The following ὅτι clause explains the counterfactual reasoning: even under the hypothetical assumption (expressed by the optative ληφθείη and the genitive absolute σημαίνοντος) that only 'white things' exist, being still cannot be one due to the distinction between the subject and its attribute.

  3. 186b5εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δʼ εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν

    A highly complex nested structure. The subject is τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι (the essence of white), and the clause states that this is not ὅπερ ὄν (essential being). This is a hypothetical premise used by Aristotle to demonstrate the absurdity resulting from confusing essential being with accidental attributes.

  4. 186b8οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν

    An infinitive construction with the impersonal phrase οἷόν τε (it is possible). The grammatical subject is τὸ ὄν (being), and the infinitive is συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ (to belong to it as an accident). The whole clause means 'for neither is it possible for being to belong to it as an accident.'

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-09-22)
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urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.3#1