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Metaphysics

§13.4#2

The Third Man and Contradictions in the Ideas

Aristotle points out various contradictions inherent in the theory of Ideas, criticizing the generation of Ideas of relatives, the 'third man', the destruction of the Platonists' own preferred principles, the extension of Ideas to non-substances, and the emptiness of adding ideal qualifications to definitions.

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§13.4#2

ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φασιν εἶναι καθʼ αὑτὸ γένος,1 οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν. ὅλως τε ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν λόγοι ἃ μᾶλλον βούλονται εἶναι οἱ λέγοντες εἴδη τοῦ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι·2 συμβαίνει γὰρ μὴ εἶναι πρῶτον τὴν δυάδα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ πρός τι καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ καθʼ αὑτό, καὶ πάνθʼ ὅσα τινὲς ἀκολουθήσαντες ταῖς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξαις ἠναντιώθησαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. ἔτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθʼ ἥν φασιν εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσονται εἴδη ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν (τὸ γὰρ νόημα ἓν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ μὴ οὐσιῶν ἐστί, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσί· συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα)· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἴδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχονται ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ ἑκάστου μετέχειν ᾗ μὴ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου λέγονται (λέγω δʼ οἷον, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ διπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ ἀϊδίου μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ διπλασίῳ ἀϊδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστε ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἴδη· ταὐτὰ δʼ ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν σημαίνει κἀκεῖ· ἢ τί ἔσται τὸ εἶναι φάναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα, τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸ εἶδος τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν μετεχόντων, ἔσται τι κοινόν (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν δυάδων, καὶ τῶν δυάδων τῶν πολλῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δέ, τὸ δυὰς ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς τινός;)· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὁμώνυμα ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅμοιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις καλοῖ ἄνθρωπον τόν τε Καλλίαν καὶ τὸ ξύλον, μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἐπιβλέψας αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς κοινοὺς λόγους ἐφαρμόττειν θήσομεν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν κύκλον σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, τὸ δʼ ὃ ἔστι3 προστεθήσεται, σκοπεῖν δεῖ μὴ κενὸν ᾖ τοῦτο παντελῶς. τίνι τε γὰρ προστεθήσεται; τῷ μέσῳ ἢ τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ ἢ πᾶσιν; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἰδέαι, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν. ἔτι δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ εἶναί τι, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπίπεδον, φύσιν τινὰ ἣ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρξει τοῖς εἴδεσιν ὡς γένος.

​Furthermore, of the more precise arguments, some make Ideas of relatives, of which they say there is no genus per se, while others lead to the ‘third man’. And in general, the arguments concerning the Forms abolish those things which those who speak of Forms wish to exist more than they wish the Ideas to exist; for it follows that the dyad is not prior but number is, and that the relative is prior to number, and this to the per se, and all other things which some, by following the opinions concerning the Forms, have asserted in opposition to their own principles. Furthermore, according to the assumption on which they say the Ideas exist, there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other things (for the concept is one not only regarding substances but also regarding non-substances, and sciences are not only of substance; and ten thousand other such things occur); but according to necessity and the opinions about them, if the Forms are participable, it is necessary that there are Ideas only of substances. For they are not participated in accidentally, but each must participate in them insofar as they are not said of a subject (I mean, for example, if something participates in ‘double itself’, this participates also in ‘eternal’, but accidentally; for it is accidental to the double to be eternal), so that the Forms will be substance. And the same terms signify substance here and there; otherwise, what will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from these, the ‘one over many’? And if the Ideas and the things participating in them have the same form, there will be something in common (for why should ‘dyad’ be one and the same in the case of destructible dyads, and the dyads which are many but eternal, any more than in the case of ‘dyad itself’ and a particular dyad?); but if they do not have the same form, they would be homonymous, quite as if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood ‘man’, without having observed any community between them. But if we assume that in other respects the common definitions apply to the Forms, as for instance ’plane figure’ and the other parts of the definition apply to ‘circle itself’, and ‘that which is’ is added, we must consider whether this is not entirely empty. For to which will it be added? To the ‘middle’ or to the ‘plane’ or to all? For all things in the substance are Ideas, as for instance ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’. Furthermore, it is clear that ‘itself’ must be something, like ‘plane’, a certain nature which will belong to all the Forms as their genus.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 1079a14ὧν οὔ φασιν εἶναι καθʼ αὑτὸ γένος

    The antecedent of the relative pronoun ὧν (of which) is the preceding 'relatives' (τῶν πρός τι). This points out the self-contradiction of the Platonists, who deny that relatives constitute a genus per se, yet are forced by their own more precise arguments to admit Ideas of relatives.

  2. 1079a15τοῦ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι

    A genitive of comparison introduced by the comparative adverb μᾶλλον (more). It compares the existence of the Ideas (τὸ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι) with those fundamental principles (represented by the relative pronoun ἃ, such as number or the one) whose existence the Platonists wish to preserve even more.

  3. 1079b5τὸ δʼ ὃ ἔστι

    The article τό substantivizes the relative clause ὃ ἔστι (that which is / the essence). It refers to the operation of appending the ideal qualification 'itself' (αὐτό) to the universal parts of a definition (e.g., 'plane figure' in the definition of a circle).

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:13.4#2