- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:9.8#2
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
Aristotle argues that the excellent person, who loves and obeys the authoritative part of himself (intellect), is a self-lover in the truest sense, and even his acts of self-sacrifice and altruism are expressions of this noble self-love that secures the greatest good for himself.
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος·1 καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθʼ ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτʼ ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴη, καθʼ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος,2 καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τʼ ἂν πάντʼ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δʼ ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δʼ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλʼ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δʼ ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτʼ ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντʼ ἂν ἐφʼ ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται3 οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δʼ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
And a person is called self-controlled or lacking self-control according as his intellect rules or does not, which implies that this is each person himself. And people are thought to have done actions themselves, and voluntarily, most of all when these are accompanied by reason. That each person is indeed this part, or is so most of all, is not unclear, and also that the decent person loves this part most. Therefore he would be indeed most of all a self-lover, after a different form from the one held in reproach, and differing as much as living in accordance with reason differs from living in accordance with passion, and desiring the noble differs from desiring what seems to be advantageous. Those, then, who are exceptionally zealous about noble actions, everyone approves and praises; and if all were to strive towards the noble and strain to perform the noblest actions, there would be both for the public all things that are necessary, and for each person individually the greatest of goods, since virtue is indeed such a thing. So, while the good person ought to be a self-lover (for he will himself benefit by doing noble actions and will help others), the wicked person ought not; for he will harm both himself and his neighbors, by following base passions. For the wicked person, then, what he ought to do and what he does clash; but the decent person does indeed what he ought to do, since every intellect chooses what is best for itself, and the decent person obeys his intellect. It is also true of the excellent person that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, even if it should be necessary to die for them. For he will abandon both money and honors, and in general the goods fought over, securing for himself the noble; for he would prefer to feel intense pleasure for a short time rather than mild pleasure for a long time, and to live nobly for one year rather than for many years by chance, and to perform one noble and great action rather than many small ones. And this is presumably what happens to those who die for others; they choose indeed a great noble thing for themselves. And they would also abandon money on the condition that their friends will receive more; for the friend gets money, while he gets the noble, and so he assigns to himself the greater good. And concerning honors and offices, it is the same way; for he will abandon all these to his friend, for this is indeed noble for him and praiseworthy. He is reasonably, then, thought to be excellent, choosing the noble in exchange for all things. And it is also possible for him to abandon actions to his friend, and it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s doing them than to do them himself. In all praiseworthy things, then, the excellent person clearly assigns to himself the greater share of the noble. In this way, then, one ought to be a self-lover, as has been said; but in the way the many are, one ought not.
- 1168b35ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος
A genitive absolute construction introduced by the subjective particle 'ὡς'. The demonstrative pronoun 'τούτου' refers back to 'τὸν νοῦν' (intellect), combined with the possessive genitive 'ἑκάστου', meaning 'on the ground that this is each person himself.'
- 1169a5διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος
A comparative structure modifying the participle 'διαφέρων'. The correlatives 'τοσοῦτον ὅσον' equate the degree of difference. 'τοῦ κατὰ πάθος' is a genitive of comparison contrasted with the articular infinitive 'τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν', meaning 'differing as much as living in accordance with reason differs from living in accordance with passion.'
- 1169a25ἐφʼ ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται
The combination of the preposition 'ἐπί' and the dative relative pronoun 'ᾧ' ('ἐφʼ ᾧ') followed by the future indicative 'λήψονται' (from λαμβάνω) forms a close-knit construction expressing condition or purpose: 'on the condition that / in order that their friends will receive more.'
