Nicomachean Ethics

​And it is also a matter of puzzle whether one ought to love oneself most, or someone else. For people censure those who love themselves most, and call them ‘self-lovers’ as a matter of reproach, and the base person seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more wicked he is, the more he does so—indeed, they accuse him, for instance, of doing nothing from himself—whereas the decent person acts for the sake of the noble, and the better he is, the more he acts for the sake of the noble, and for the sake of his friend, while neglecting his own interest. But the facts clash with these arguments, not without reason. For they say that one ought to love most the person who is most a friend, and he is most a friend who wishes good things to the person for whom he wishes them for that person’s sake, even if no one will know it. And these conditions belong most of all to oneself in relation to oneself, and so too do all the other things by which a friend is defined. For it has been said that all friendly relations extend from oneself and spread to others. And all the proverbs agree in mind, such as ‘one soul’, and ‘friends’ property is common’, and ‘equality is friendship’, and ‘the knee is closer than the shin’. For all these would belong most of all to oneself in relation to oneself; for one is most a friend to oneself, and so indeed one ought to love oneself most. So it is reasonably a matter of puzzle which of the two one ought to follow, since both positions carry conviction. Perhaps, then, one ought to distinguish and define such arguments, to see to what extent and in what way each is true. If, then, we grasp how each side uses the term ‘self-lover’, it would perhaps become clear. Those, then, who bring it into reproach call ‘self-lovers’ those who assign to themselves the greater share of money, honors, and bodily pleasures; for the many desire these things and are zealous about them as being the best, which is why they are also fought over. And those who are greedy for these things gratify their desires, and in general their passions and the non-rational part of the soul; and the many are of this kind, which is why the designation has arisen from the many who are base; justly, then, are those who are self-lovers in this way censured. That the many are accustomed to call ‘self-lovers’ those who assign such things to themselves is not unclear; for if someone were always zealous to do what is just himself, most of all people, or what is temperate, or any other actions in accordance with the virtues, and in general were always to secure what is noble for himself, no one will call this person a self-lover or censure him. Yet such a person would seem to be more of a self-lover; at any rate, he assigns to himself the noblest and best things, and gratifies the most authoritative part of himself, obeying it in everything. And just as a city or any other systematic whole seems to be most of all its most authoritative part, so too does a human being; and so he who loves this part and gratifies it is indeed most a self-lover.