Nicomachean Ethics

​Another species of friendship is that based on superiority, for example that of a father toward a son, and in general of an older person toward a younger, and of a husband toward a wife, and of any ruler toward a subject. And these differ also from one another; for that of parents toward children is not the same as that of rulers toward subjects, nor is that of a father toward a son the same as that of a son toward a father, nor that of a husband toward a wife the same as that of a wife toward a husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these are different, and the reasons for which they love are also different; therefore their lovings and their friendships are also different. Thus, the same things do not come to each from the other, nor should they be sought; but when children render to parents what they ought to those who begot them, and parents render what they ought to their children, the friendship of such persons will be lasting and decent. And in all friendships that are based on superiority, the loving also ought to be proportional, for example, the better person should be loved more than he loves, and the more useful person likewise, and each of the others similarly; for when the loving is in accordance with worth, then a sort of equality arises, which indeed is thought to belong to friendship. But equality does not appear to hold in the same way in just relations and in friendship; for in just relations equality in accordance with worth is primary, and that in accordance with quantity is secondary, whereas in friendship that in accordance with quantity is primary, and that in accordance with worth is secondary. This becomes clear if a great interval arises in virtue or vice or wealth or anything else; for they are no longer friends, nor do they even expect to be. This is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass all in all good things to the greatest degree. And it is clear also in the case of kings; for those who are much inferior do not expect to be friends with them, nor do those of no worth expect to be friends with the best or wisest. In such cases, then, there is no precise definition up to what point they remain friends; for though many things are taken away, it still remains, but when one is separated by a great distance, as the god is, it no longer remains. Hence indeed a puzzle is raised, whether friends ever do not wish for their friends the greatest of goods, for instance, to be gods; for then they will no longer be friends to them, and so not even goods; for friends are goods. If, then, it has been well said that a friend wishes goods to his friend for his sake, the friend would need to remain such as he is; so, to him as a human being, he will wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all goods; for each wishes goods to himself most of all.