- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:8.6
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
Discusses the limitations of friendship among the sour, the elderly, and the powerful, explaining why perfect friendship is limited to a few, and analyzes utility and pleasure friendships based on their likeness and unlikeness to true friendship.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστʼ εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δʼ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δʼ οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δʼ εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δʼ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δʼ οὐδʼ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι.1 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δʼ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὑτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δʼ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετʼ ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δʼ οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλʼ ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται·2 εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δʼ εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι. εἰσὶ δʼ οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθʼ ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντʼ ὠφελείας· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ διʼ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθʼ ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατʼ ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἣ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δʼ ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι,3 ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι, διʼ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.
But friendship arises less among sour and elderly people, in proportion as they are more difficult and enjoy social intercourse less; for these things seem to be most of all friendly and productive of friendship. Therefore the young indeed become friends quickly, but old people do not; for they do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight; and similarly neither do sour people. But such people are indeed well-wishers to one another; for they wish good things and meet each other’s needs; but they are not really friends because they do not spend their days together or delight in each other, which indeed seem to be most characteristic of friendship. But to be a friend to many in accordance with perfect friendship is not possible, just as it is not possible to love many passionately at the same time (for such a thing seems like an excess, and what is such is naturally directed toward one person); and for the same person to please many people greatly at the same time is not easy, and perhaps not even for them all to be good. And it is necessary also to gain experience and to become intimate, which is very difficult. But on account of utility and pleasure it is possible to please many; for such people are many, and the services are rendered in a short time. And of these, the friendship on account of pleasure seems more like friendship, when the same things come from both and they delight in each other or in the same things, such as the friendships of the young are; for there is more of a liberal character in these. But the friendship on account of utility belongs to mercenary people. And the blessed indeed have no need of useful people, but they do of pleasant ones; for they wish to live with some people, and though they bear what is painful for a short time, no one could endure it continuously, not even the good itself, if it were painful to him; wherefore they seek friends who are pleasant. But perhaps they ought also to be good, being such, and further, good to themselves; for so they will have all that friends should have. But those in positions of authority seem to make use of their friends as divided; for some are useful to them and others pleasant, but both in the same person is not very common; for they do not seek either pleasant friends with virtue or useful ones for noble deeds, but aiming at pleasure they seek witty people, and for doing what is commanded they seek those who are clever, and these things do not very much occur in the same person. But it has been said that the excellent man is both pleasant and useful at the same time; but such a man does not become a friend to a superior unless he is also surpassed in virtue; otherwise, he does not equalize by being surpassed proportionally. But such people do not very often exist. At all events, the friendships that have been mentioned are based on equality; for the same things come from both and they wish the same for each other, or they exchange one thing for another, for instance pleasure for utility. And that these are less truly friendships and remain less, has been said. But they seem, through likeness and unlikeness to the same thing, both to be and not to be friendships. For in respect of likeness to the friendship in accordance with virtue they appear to be friendships (for the one has pleasure and the other utility, and these belong also to that one), but in that the one is secure against slander and lasting, while these quickly change and differ in many other respects, they do not appear to be friendships, through unlikeness to that one.
- 1158a14ἴσως δʼ οὐδʼ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι
Concerning the subject of the infinitive εἶναι, two interpretations are possible in context. First, taking 'many people' (the object of ἀρέσκειν) as the subject: 'it is not easy for them all to be good'. Second, taking the person who pleases many as the subject: 'it is not easy for the one who pleases so many to be good at the same time'. Since perfect friendship can only exist between good people, the former interpretation is adopted here, as it is highly unlikely for all of a large group of people to be good.
- 1158a34ἐὰν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται
The subject of the passive verb ὑπερέχηται is the 'superior person' (ὑπερέχων) mentioned just before. Thus, it means 'unless he (the superior) is also surpassed (by the excellent man) in virtue'. It explains that unless the superior accepts being surpassed in virtue by the excellent man, a proportional equality (ἀνάλογον) cannot be established, and friendship will not arise.
- 1158b8τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι
This is a dative construction (τῷ + infinitive clause) indicating cause or standard, standing in contrast to the prepositional phrase 'in respect of likeness' (καθʼ ὁμοιότητα) in the preceding clause. It introduces the ground for the subsequent judgement 'they do not appear to be friendships' (οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι), meaning 'by virtue of the fact that...' or 'in that...'.
