Nicomachean Ethics

​But the licentious person, as was said, is not prone to regret; for he abides by his choice. On the other hand, every incontinent person is prone to regret. Therefore, the case is not as we raised as a puzzle, but rather the former is incurable and the latter curable. For vice is like such diseases as dropsy and consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; for the former is a continuous wickedness, while the latter is not continuous. And in general, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice; for vice is latent, whereas incontinence is not latent. But among these themselves, those who are prone to ecstasy are better than those who possess reason but do not abide by it; for the latter are defeated by a lesser passion, and are not without prior deliberation like the former. For the incontinent person is like those who get drunk quickly and by a small amount of wine, or by less than most people. It is clear, then, that incontinence is not a vice (though perhaps in a certain way it is); for the one is contrary to choice, and the other is in accordance with choice. Nevertheless, they are at least similar in their actions, just like Demodocus’ saying about the Milesians: “The Milesians are indeed not stupid, but they act just as stupid people do.” So too, the incontinent are not unjust, but they will do unjust deeds. And since the one is of such a character as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to right reason, not because he is convinced of it, while the other is convinced because he is the sort of person who pursues them, the former is easily persuaded to change, but the latter is not. For virtue preserves the principle, while vice destroys it, and in actions the “that for the sake of which” is the principle, just as hypotheses are in mathematics. Neither there, then, is reason capable of teaching the principles, nor is it here; but it is virtue, either natural or habituated, that produces right opinion concerning the principle. Therefore, the temperate person is such a one, and the licentious is the opposite. But there is a person who, because of passion, is out of his mind contrary to right reason, whom passion masters so far as to prevent him from acting according to right reason, but does not master so far as to make him the sort of person who is convinced that he ought to pursue such pleasures unreservedly. This is the incontinent person, who is better than the licentious, and not simply bad; for the best thing, the principle, is preserved in him. But another is the opposite, the one who abides and does not abandon reason, at least because of passion. It is clear from these things, then, that the former is a good state, and the latter a bad one.