- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:7.7
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-29
This section categorizes the states of character (incontinence, continence, softness, and resistance) regarding the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, distinguishes licentiousness from incontinence, and explains the two types of incontinence: impetuosity and weakness.
περὶ δὲ τὰς διʼ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε1 ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δʼ ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὃ δʼ ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὃ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δʼ ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἳ δʼ οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δʼ ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδʼ αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων †ἢ καθʼ ὑπερβολὰς†2 ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, διʼ αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν διʼ ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστʼ ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων3 τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ διʼ ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δʼ ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὃ δʼ ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δʼ ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς4 οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δʼ ἀσθένεια. οἳ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες5 οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτʼ ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτʼ ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δʼ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
With regard to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and desires and avoidances (concerning which licentiousness and temperance were previously defined), it is possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by those things which most people are superior to, and it is possible to master even those things which most people are defeated by. Of these persons, the one concerned with pleasures is incontinent and the other continent, while the one concerned with pains is soft and the other resistant. The state of most people is in between, even if they lean more toward the worse states. Since some pleasures are necessary and others are not, and the former are necessary only up to a certain point, but their excesses are not, nor are their deficiencies, and the same holds true for desires and pains, the person who pursues excesses of pleasant things, or pursues them to excess, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not for any other result, is licentious. For such a person must not be prone to regret, and is therefore incurable; for the person without regret is incurable. The one who falls short is the opposite, and the one in the middle is temperate. Similarly, the person who avoids bodily pains, not through being defeated but by choice, is also licentious. Of those who do not act by choice, one is led because of pleasure, and the other because of avoiding the pain that comes from desire, so they differ from one another. And everyone would judge that a person is worse if, without desiring or desiring only weakly, they should do something shameful, than if they did so while desiring strongly; and if they should strike someone without being angry than if they did so while angry. For what would they do if they were in the grip of passion? Therefore, the licentious person is worse than the incontinent. Of the states mentioned, then, the former is rather a form of softness, while the latter is licentiousness. The continent person is opposed to the incontinent, and the resistant to the soft; for resisting consists in holding out, while continence consists in mastering, and holding out is different from mastering, just as not being defeated is different from winning. Therefore, continence is more desirable than resistance. But the person who falls short in resisting those things which most people hold out against and are capable of, is soft and effeminate; for effeminacy is a kind of softness. Such a person drags their cloak so as not to suffer the pain of lifting it, and by mimicking a sick person, does not think themselves wretched, though they are like a wretched person. The same holds true concerning continence and incontinence. For it is not surprising if someone is defeated by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains, but rather pardonable if they hold out against them, like Philoctetes in the play of Theodectes when bitten by the viper, or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or like people who, trying to restrain their laughter, burst into a loud guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus. But it is surprising if someone is defeated by and cannot resist those things which most people are capable of holding out against, unless this is due to the nature of their race or to disease, like the hereditary softness among the kings of the Scythians, or the way the female is distinguished from the male. The lover of amusement is also thought to be licentious, but is actually soft. For amusement is relaxation, since it is a rest; and the lover of amusement is one of those who exceed in this. Of incontinence, one kind is impetuosity, and the other is weakness. For some people, having deliberated, do not abide by what they deliberated because of passion, while others are led by passion because they have not deliberated. For some, just as those who have tickled themselves beforehand do not feel tickled, so also by perceiving and seeing beforehand, and by rousing themselves and their reason beforehand, are not defeated by passion, whether it is pleasant or painful. It is especially the quick-tempered and the melancholic who are incontinent with the impetuous kind of incontinence; for the former because of their swiftness and the latter because of their intensity do not wait for reason, because they are prone to follow their imagination.
- 1150a10ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε...
The impersonal verb ἔστι ('it is possible') is followed by an adverbial clause of result with ὥστε, meaning 'it is possible to be in such a condition as to...'
- 1150a19†ἢ καθʼ ὑπερβολὰσ†
A corrupted textual passage marked with daggers. It is generally understood as qualifying the participle διώκων, parallel to ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν ('or by choice'), meaning 'or to excess.'
- 1150a24ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων...
The ellipsis of 'is licentious' (ἀκόλαστός ἐστιν) must be supplied at the end of the sentence, corresponding to the definition of the pursuer of pleasures in the preceding lines.
- 1150b12ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς...
Following the opening 'it is not surprising' (οὐ... θαυμαστόν), this conditional clause (ἀλλ' εἴ τις...) requires the omission of 'it is surprising' (θαυμαστόν ἐστιν) to be supplied in the apodosis.
- 1150b21ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες
The prefix προ- means 'beforehand' or 'in advance.' It refers to the physiological phenomenon where tickling oneself beforehand, or bracing oneself, prevents the sensation of being tickled, used here as a metaphor for mental preparation.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revision history (2, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 1
