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Nicomachean Ethics

§3.8#2

Spurious Courage from Passion, Optimism, and Ignorance

The author analyzes how actions resulting from passion, optimism, and ignorance differ from true courage, and defines true courage as the state of character that remains undisturbed under sudden alarms.

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§3.8#2

καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα,1 ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δʼ ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος" καὶ "ἔζεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπʼ ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. φυσικωτάτη δʼ ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.2 καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δʼ ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδʼ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δʼ ἔχουσί τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δʼ ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν,3 ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς·4 τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δʼ ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δʼ ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δʼ ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις.5 οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

​People also refer anger to courage; for those who, driven by anger, rush upon those who have wounded them, like wild beasts, also seem to be courageous, because the courageous are also high-spirited. For anger is most impetuous in rushing into dangers, whence Homer also says, “put strength into his passion,” and “roused his might and anger,” and “bitter wrath in his nostrils,” and “his blood boiled”; for all such expressions seem to signify the arousal and impulse of passion. Now, the courageous act for the sake of the noble, and passion cooperates with them; but wild beasts act from pain; for they act because they have been wounded or because they are frightened, since if they are in the forests, they do not attack. Therefore, they are not courageous because, driven by pain and passion, they rush towards danger without foreseeing any of the perils; since on this showing even asses would be courageous when they are hungry, for they do not leave their pasture even when beaten. Adulterers also do many daring things because of their desire. But the courage that is due to passion seems to be the most natural, and if it takes to itself choice and purpose, it is true courage. Indeed, men when angry feel pain, and when they exact vengeance they feel pleasure; but those who fight for these reasons are pugnacious, not courageous; for they do not act for the sake of the noble nor as reason directs, but from passion; yet they possess something very like courage. Nor indeed are those who are optimistic courageous; for they are confident in dangers because they have conquered often and many. But they resemble the courageous because both are confident; yet the courageous are confident for the reasons already stated, whereas the optimistic are so because they think they are the strongest and will suffer nothing. Drunken people also do something of this sort; for they become optimistic. But when things do not turn out as they expected, they flee; whereas it was the mark of a courageous person to endure things that are and appear terrifying to a human being, because it is noble to do so and disgraceful not to. Therefore also, to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms seems to belong to a more courageous person than to be so in dangers that are foreseen; for it was more a result of character, because it depends less on preparation. For one might choose foreseen dangers even from calculation and reason, but sudden ones are chosen according to character. Those who are ignorant also appear courageous, and they are not far from the optimistic, but they are worse to the extent that they have no self-esteem, whereas the optimistic have it. Therefore, they also stand their ground for a certain time; but those who have been deceived, if they find out or suspect that the case is otherwise, they flee, as happened to the Argives when they fell in with the Lacedaemonians, mistaking them for Sicyonians. We have now described both the courageous and those who are thought to be courageous.

Syntax notes5 items
  1. 1116b25ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα

    The neuter plural nominative participle φερόμενα agrees in gender, number, and case with the subject τὰ θηρία (neuter plural) within the subordinate clause, describing the behavior of wild beasts turning on those who wounded them. This image serves as a metaphor for people who charge driven solely by passion.

  2. 1117a4–5καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.

    The subject of the nominative feminine singular participle προσλαβοῦσα is the courage due to passion from the preceding sentence. Contextually, this participle functions conditionally ('if it takes to itself'), and the infinitive εἶναι depends on the main verb ἔοικεν of the previous clause, leading to the conclusion 'it seems to be/becomes true courage.'

  3. 1117a17ἀνδρείου δʼ ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν

    The genitive ἀνδρείου is a possessive genitive denoting characteristic or duty ('it is the mark of a courageous person'). The past tense ἦν is a 'philosophical imperfect' (or imperfect of definition), commonly used by Aristotle to refer back to established definitions or essential characteristics, representing a general and current truth.

  4. 1117a20ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς

    The subject of the impersonal ἦν is understood from the preceding clause: 'to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms.' Here again, ἦν is an imperfect of definition/essence. It sets up a contrast between action originating 'from character' (ἀπὸ ἕξεως) and action originating 'from preparation' (ἐκ παρασκευῆς).

  5. 1117a26ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις.

    The relative pronoun ὅπερ takes the preceding event (fleeing upon realizing or suspecting the truth) as its antecedent. The dative Σικυωνίοις, accompanied by ὡς showing subjective belief, stands in apposition to τοῖς Λάκωσιν, meaning 'mistaking the Lacedaemonians for Sicyonians.'

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:3.8#2