← Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics

§3.8#1

Political Courage and Courage Based on Experience

Aristotle begins to discuss five different forms of courage that resemble true courage, first contrasting 'political courage' (based on honor and shame) with compelled courage, and secondly explaining 'experience-based courage' (familiarity with danger) using the different behaviors of citizen-troops and professional soldiers.

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§3.8#1

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρʼ οἷς1 οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα· "Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·" καὶ "Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσʼ ἀγορεύων Τυδείδης ὑπʼ ἐμεῖο." ὡμοίωται δʼ αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι διʼ ἀρετὴν γίνεται· διʼ αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δʼ ἄν2 τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· χείρους δʼ, ὅσῳ οὐ διʼ αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ "ὃν δέ κʼ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω, οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας." καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δʼ οὐ διʼ ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δʼ οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη3 καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δʼ ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

​Now courage is indeed something of this sort, but five other kinds also are spoken of, under five modes. First, political courage; for this most resembles true courage. For citizens seem to endure dangers because of the penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches they would incur, and because of the honors they receive; and for this reason those peoples seem to be most courageous among whom cowards are dishonored and the courageous are honored. Homer also portrays people of this sort, such as Diomedes and Hector: “Polydamas will be the first to cast reproach upon me;” and “For Hector will one day say, when speaking among the Trojans: ‘The son of Tydeus, by my hand...’” And this kind of courage most resembles the one described before, because it arises from virtue; for it arises from shame and from a desire for the noble (for it is for honor) and to avoid reproach, which is disgraceful. One might also class those who are compelled by their rulers in the same category; but they are worse to the extent that they act not from shame but from fear, and flee not what is disgraceful but what is painful. For their masters compel them, just as Hector does: “But whomsoever I shall see cowering far from the fight, it shall not be possible for him to escape the dogs.” And those who station men and beat them if they retreat do the same, as do those who draw them up in front of trenches and suchlike; for they all use compulsion. But one ought to be courageous not under compulsion, but because it is noble. Also, experience in each department is thought to be courage; whence Socrates also thought courage to be knowledge. Now, different people have this experience in different matters, and in war, the professional soldiers have it. For war seems to have many false alarms, which these men have especially observed; consequently, they appear courageous because others do not know the nature of these alarms. Again, they are best able to inflict damage and not suffer it, thanks to their experience, being able to use their weapons and having such as are best both for inflicting damage and for not suffering it. Therefore, they fight like armed men against unarmed, or like trained athletes against amateurs; for in such contests also it is not the most courageous who are the best fighters, but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the best condition. But professional soldiers become cowards when the danger exceeds their strength and they are deficient in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to flee, while the citizen-troops stand their ground and die, as happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the citizens, flight is disgraceful and death is preferable to such safety; but the professional soldiers from the very beginning faced danger only because they thought they were superior, and when they realize the truth they flee, fearing death more than disgrace. But the courageous person is not of this sort.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 1116a20παρʼ οἷς

    The antecedent of the relative pronoun οἷς is not explicitly written, but refers to the implied cities (πόλεις) or communities of citizens implied by πολῖται. It means 'among those peoples [or in those cities] where...'.

  2. 1116a25τάξαι δʼ ἄν

    The optative with ἄν (τάξαι... ἄν) expresses potentiality ('one might place/class...'). εἰς ταὐτό ('into the same place') refers to the same category of courage as the 'political' courage just described, or more family-wise, the types that resemble true courage.

  3. 1116b10ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη

    In the relative clause introduced by ὁποῖα ('of such a sort as'), ἄν with the optative εἴη expresses a general potentiality ('such as would be...'). The adjective κράτιστα (neuter plural) functions as a predicate nominative within this clause, modifying the implied weapons.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:3.8#1