Nicomachean Ethics

​Since the end is an object of wishing, and the means to the end are objects of deliberation and choice, the actions concerning these things would be in accordance with choice and voluntary. And the activities of the virtues are concerned with these things. Virtue, then, is also up to us, and similarly vice as well. For in those cases where acting is up to us, not acting is also up to us, and where “no” is, “yes” is also. So that if acting, when it is noble, is up to us, not acting, when it is shameful, will also be up to us, and if not acting, when it is noble, is up to us, acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us. And if doing noble and shameful deeds is up to us, and similarly not doing them, and this was what it is to be good and bad, then being decent and base is up to us. But the saying that “no one is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly blessed” seems partly false and partly true; for no one is unwillingly blessed, but wickedness is voluntary. Or else one must dispute what has just been said, and deny that a human being is an origin or begetter of his actions as he is of his children. And if these things are apparent, and we cannot refer them to any other origins than those within us, then those actions whose origins are in us are themselves also up to us and voluntary. This seems to be attested both by individuals in their private lives and by the legislators themselves. For they punish and chastise those who commit wicked deeds, except those who do them under force or through ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible, and they honor those who do noble deeds, as if to encourage the latter and restrain the former. Yet no one encourages us to do things that are neither up to us nor voluntary, since there is no advantage in being persuaded not to feel heat, or pain, or hunger, or anything else of the sort; for we shall suffer them nonetheless. Indeed, they punish someone for ignorance itself, if he seems to be the cause of his ignorance, as in the case of those who are drunk, the penalties are double; for the origin was in him; since he had the power not to get drunk, and this was the cause of his ignorance. And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws which they ought to know and which is not difficult, and similarly in other cases where people seem to be ignorant through negligence, on the ground that it was up to them not to be ignorant; for they had the power to take care. But perhaps he is of such a character as not to take care. But they themselves are responsible for having become such people by living slackly, and for being unjust or intemperate, the former by doing wrong, the latter by spending their time in drinking-bouts and the like. For activities concerning each thing make people of that character. This is clear from those who train for any competition or action; for they continue practicing. Now, to be ignorant of the fact that states arise from practicing concerning each thing is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. Moreover, it is irrational to suppose that a person who does wrong does not wish to be unjust, or that one who acts intemperately does not wish to be intemperate. If anyone, not being ignorant, does those things as a result of which he will become unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily; yet it does not follow that, if he wishes, he will cease to be unjust and be just. For neither does a sick man become healthy. And if it so happens, he is sick voluntarily, by living intemperately and disobeying his doctors. At that time, then, it was open to him not to be sick, but once he has let the opportunity go, it is no longer so, just as it is no longer possible for someone who has let go of a stone to recover it; yet for all that, the throwing was up to him, for the origin was in him.