- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:3.4
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-29
Aristotle discusses whether the object of wishing is the true good or the apparent good, concluding that the true good is desired by the excellent person while the apparent good is desired by the base person, making the excellent person the standard of truth.
ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος1 (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δʼ, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δʼ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλʼ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δʼ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν,2 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δʼ ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν,3 ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
On the other hand, it has been said that wishing is for the end; but to some it seems to be for the good, and to others for the apparent good. And it follows for those who say that the object of wishing is the good that what is wished for by the person who does not choose correctly is not an object of wishing (for if it is to be an object of wishing, it must also be good; but it was, as it happened, bad); while for those, on the other hand, who say that the apparent good is the object of wishing, it follows that there is no object of wishing by nature, but rather what seems so to each person; but different things appear to different people, and, as it happens, even contrary things. But if these views are not satisfying, should we say that, in an absolute sense and in truth, the object of wishing is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good? For the excellent person, then, it is what is so in truth, while for the base person it is whatever happens to be, just as in the case of bodies, for those in good condition, things that are truly so are healthy, while for those who are sickly, other things are, and similarly with bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and each of the other things. For the excellent person judges each thing correctly, and in each case the truth appears to him. For according to each state there are its own beautiful and pleasant things, and the excellent person differs most, perhaps, in seeing the truth in each case, being as it were their standard and measure. But in the case of the many, the deception seems to occur because of pleasure; for it appears to be a good, though it is not. They choose, therefore, the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.
- 1113a15συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος
The syntax of 'συμβαίνει ... μὴ εἶναι βουλητόν'. The dative phrase 'τοῖς λέγουσι' functions as the logical subject ('it follows for those who say') with the impersonal verb 'συμβαίνει'. In the infinitive clause 'μὴ εἶναι βουλητόν', the real subject is the relative clause 'ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος' ('what is wished for by the person who does not choose correctly').
- 1113a25τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν
The verb 'ἐστί' (or 'βουλητόν ἐστι') is omitted. The phrase means 'for the excellent person, what is in truth [is the object of wishing], while for the base person, whatever happens to be [is the object of wishing]', presenting Aristotle's own answer to the preceding question.
- 1113a30διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν
The phrase 'τῷ ... ὁρᾶν' is an articular infinitive in the neuter dative singular, functioning as a dative of respect or cause with the verb of difference 'διαφέρει' ('differs in seeing' or 'differs because of seeing').