Nicomachean Ethics

Since we have discussed what concerns virtues, friendship, and pleasures, it remains to outline happiness, since we posit it as the end of human affairs. Indeed, if we recapitulate what has been said before, our account would be shorter. For we said that it is not a state; for otherwise it might belong even to someone who sleeps throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or to someone who suffers the greatest misfortunes. If, then, these views are not satisfying, but we must rather class happiness as a certain activity, as has been said in our earlier discussions, and if among activities some are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else while others are desirable in themselves, it is clear that happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves and not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness is in need of nothing but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity itself. And actions in accordance with virtue seem to be of this sort; for to perform beautiful and excellent actions is among the things desirable for their own sake. And among amusements, those that are pleasant are also of this sort; for people do not choose them for the sake of other things; indeed, they are harmed by them rather than benefited, neglecting their bodies and their possessions. And many of those who are congratulated on their happiness flee to such pastimes, which is why those who are witty in such pastimes are highly regarded by tyrants; for they offer themselves as pleasant in the things that tyrants desire, and tyrants are in need of such people. Therefore, these things indeed seem to produce happiness because those in positions of power spend their leisure in them, but such people are perhaps no indication; for virtue and intellect, from which excellent activities arise, do not consist in being in power; nor if these people, having no taste for pure and liberal pleasure, flee to bodily pleasures, should we on that account think that these are more desirable; for children also think that the things valued among themselves are the best. It is reasonable, then, that just as different things appear valuable to children and to men, so too to bad and to decent people. Therefore, as has been said many times, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are so to the good person; and for each person the activity in accordance with his proper state is most desirable, and so for the good person it is the activity in accordance with virtue. Happiness, then, does not consist in amusement; for it would be absurd for amusement to be our end, and for us to trouble ourselves and suffer hardship throughout our whole life for the sake of playing. For we choose everything, so to speak, for the sake of something else, except happiness; for this is the end. But to exert oneself and labor for the sake of amusement seems foolish and utterly childish. But to play so that one may be serious, as Anacharsis says, seems to be right; for amusement resembles relaxation, and since people cannot labor continuously, they need relaxation. Relaxation, then, is certainly not the end; for it exists for the sake of the activity. And the happy life seems to be in accordance with virtue; and this involves serious effort, and does not consist in amusement. And we say that serious things are better than laughable things and those associated with amusement, and that the activity of the better part and of the better person is always more serious. And the activity of the better part is already superior and more productive of happiness. Anyone at all, even a slave, might enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best person; but no one attributes happiness to a slave, unless they also attribute a human life to him. For happiness does not consist in such pastimes, but in activities in accordance with virtue, as has also been said before.