Nicomachean Ethics

​Therefore, the pleasure proper to a good activity is decent, while that proper to a bad one is corrupt; for the desires for beautiful things are praiseworthy, while those for shameful things are blameworthy. And the pleasures in the activities are more proper to them than the desires are; for the latter are distinguished both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activities, and so indistinguishable from them that it is a matter of dispute whether the activity and the pleasure are the same. Nevertheless, pleasure does not indeed seem to be thought or sensation (for that would be absurd), but because they are not separated, it appears to some to be the same. Therefore, just as the activities are different, so too are the pleasures. And sight differs from touch in purity, and hearing and smell from taste; in a similar way, then, the pleasures also differ, and among these, those concerning thought differ, and each of these groups differs from the other. And there seems to be a proper pleasure for each animal, just as there is a proper function; for this is the pleasure according to its activity. And this would also appear to anyone who considers individual cases; for the pleasure of a horse, a dog, and a human is different, just as Heraclitus says that donkeys would choose sweepings rather than gold; for food is more pleasant to donkeys than gold. Therefore, while the pleasures of things that differ in species differ themselves in species, it is reasonable for those of the same species to be indistinguishable. Yet they vary to no small degree, at least in the case of humans; for the same things delight some and pain others, and are painful and hateful to some but pleasant and lovable to others. This happens also in the case of sweet things; for the same things do not seem sweet to someone with a fever and someone in health, nor does the same thing seem hot to an invalid and to someone in good condition. And this happens similarly in other cases as well. But in all such cases, that which appears to the good person is thought to be the reality. If this is said well, as it seems to be, and virtue and the good person, insofar as he is such, are the measure of each thing, then those things would be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant in which he delights. And if the things offensive to him appear pleasant to someone, it is not at all surprising; for many are the corruptions and ruins of humans; but these are not pleasant, except to these people and to those in such a state. Therefore, as for those pleasures that are confessedly shameful, it is clear that they should not be called pleasures, except for those who are corrupted. But among those that seem to be decent, what sort or which of them should be said to be the pleasure of a human? Or is it clear from the activities? For the pleasures follow upon these. Whether, then, there is one or more activities of the complete and blessed man, the pleasures that complete these would be said to be the pleasures of a human in the primary sense, and the remaining pleasures in a secondary and remote sense, just like the activities.