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Republic

§10.602

The Ignorance of Imitators and the Soul's Lower Part

Socrates demonstrates that the imitator has neither knowledge nor correct opinion about the things they imitate, but only targets what appears beautiful to the ignorant mass. He then argues that optical illusions and sensory imitations appeal not to the calculating, rational part of the soul, but to a lower, irrational part.

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§10.602

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει1 περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, συνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. πάνυ γε. ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει περὶ ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν; οὐδέτερα. οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. οὐκ ἔοικεν. χαρίεις ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ. οὐ πάνυ. ἀλλʼ οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστόν· ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, τοῦτο μιμήσεται. τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὥς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλʼ εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τούς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἁπτομένους ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. πρὸς Διός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μέν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἦ γάρ; ναί. πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει;2 τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις; τοῦ τοιοῦδε· ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται. οὐ γάρ. καὶ ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατί τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὖ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δήλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί. ἀληθῆ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρῆσαν ἢ καὶ στῆσαν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. τούτου γὰρ οὖν. τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι3 μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. ναί. οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι; καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ ἔφαμεν.

​Therefore, concerning the same implement, the maker will have right belief about its beauty and badness, by associating with the one who knows and being compelled to listen to the one who knows, whereas the user will have knowledge. Certainly. But will the imitator have knowledge about the things he paints—whether they are beautiful and correct or not—from using them, or will he have correct opinion because of necessarily associating with the one who knows and being instructed as to how he ought to paint? Neither. Therefore, the imitator will neither know nor have correct opinion about the things he imitates, in respect to their beauty or badness. It doesn’t seem so. A fine thing, then, would be the imitator in poetry in respect to wisdom about the things he makes. Not very. But nevertheless, he will imitate, not knowing about each thing in what way it is bad or useful; but, as it seems, whatever appears to be beautiful to the many who know nothing, this is what he will imitate. For what else? These things then, as it seems, have been fairly well agreed upon by us: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about the things he imitates, but that imitation is a kind of play and not a serious pursuit, and that those who take up tragic poetry in iambics and in epic meters are all imitators to the highest possible degree. By all means. ”By Zeus,” I said, “but is not this imitating concerned with something that is third from the truth? Is it not?” “Yes.” “But to what kind of part among those of human beings does it appeal, having the power that it has?” “What kind of part do you mean?” “The following: the same magnitude, I suppose, does not appear equal to us through our sight from near and from far.” “Indeed not.” “And the same things appear bent and straight when seen in water and out of it, and concave and convex because of the illusion of sight concerning colors, and every such confusion is clearly present in our soul. Shadow-painting, by preying upon this affection of our nature, falls nothing short of magic, as do puppetry and many other such devices.” “True.” “Have not, then, measuring, counting, and weighing appeared as the most welcome aids against these things, so that what rules in us is not the appearance of being larger or smaller, or more or heavier, but that which has calculated, measured, or weighed?” “How could it be otherwise?” ”But this, surely, would be the work of the calculating part in the soul.” “Indeed, of that part.” “And to this part, though it has measured many times and indicates that some things are larger or smaller than others or equal, the opposites appear at the same time concerning the same things.” “Yes.” “Now, did we not say that it is impossible for the same part to hold opposite opinions at the same time about the same things?” “And we were right to say so.”

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 602τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει

    Here ποιητής refers to the "maker" or "craftsman" of the implement, not the "poet", following the examples of the reins, bit, and flute from the previous section. It corresponds to ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει (the one who trusts and makes) in 601e, contrasting the "right belief" (πίστις ὀρθή) of the maker with the "knowledge" (ἐπιστήμη) of the user.

  2. 602cπρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει;

    The partitive genitive τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ("of the things belonging to man") implies the faculties or parts of the human soul (with τῆς ψυχῆς understood). The main verb construction πρὸς... ἐστιν means "it is directed towards / it appeals to".

  3. 602eτούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι

    The dative pronoun τούτῳ refers to the "calculating part in the soul" (τοῦ λογιστικοῦ) mentioned just before. The accompanying dative participles μετρήσαντι and σημαίνοντι express the actions of this part, carrying a concessive force ("although it has measured and indicated"). This dative functions as the complement of φαίνεται ("appears to it").

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-23)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:10.602