Republic

”Does it not, then, appear to have some such power that, in whatever it arises—whether in some city, or a clan, or an army, or anything else whatsoever—first, it makes it impossible for it to act with itself because of faction and disagreement, and further, makes it an enemy both to itself and to everything opposite and to the just? Is it not so?” “Certainly.” “And when it is present indeed in one person, I think it will produce these very same things which it is by nature suited to work. First, it will make him unable to act, because he is at faction and not of one mind with himself, and next, an enemy both to himself and to the just. Is that not so?” “Yes.” “And are the gods also just, my friend?” “Let it be so,” he said. ”Then the unjust man, Thrasymachus, will be an enemy also to the gods, and the just man a friend.” “Feast on the argument,” he said, “boldly; for I certainly will not oppose you, so that I may not become hateful to these people here.” “Go on then,” I said, “and fill up the rest of the feast for me by answering just as you are doing now. For that the just appear both wiser and better and more powerful to act, while the unjust are not even able to act with one another— but indeed, even when we say that any who are unjust ever vigorously achieved anything together in common, we do not speak the whole truth; for they would not have refrained from one another if they had been completely unjust, but it is clear that some justice was present in them, which made them not wrong both one another and those against whom they went at the same time, through which they achieved what they achieved, and they rushed toward unjust deeds being only half-corrupted by injustice, since those who are thoroughly wicked and completely unjust are also completely unable to act—these things, then, I understand to be so, and not as you at first posited; but whether the just also live better than the unjust and are happier, which we proposed to examine later, must be examined. Indeed, even now they appear to do so, as it seems to me at least, from what we have said; nevertheless, we must examine it still better. For the argument is not about some casual matter, but about how one ought to live.” “Consider it then,” he said. “I am considering it,” I said. “And tell me: do you think there is some function of a horse?” ”Certainly.” “Would you then posit this as the function both of a horse and of anything else whatsoever: that which one can perform either only with that thing or best with it?” “I do not understand,” he said. “But look at it this way: is there anything else with which you could see than with eyes?” “Certainly not.” “And what? Could you hear with anything else than with ears?” “In no way.” “Then do we not justly say that these are the functions of those?” “Certainly.”