Republic

”I ask this, then, which I did just now, so that we may examine the argument in order, as to what kind of thing justice is in relation to injustice. For it was said somewhere that injustice is both more powerful and stronger than justice; but now indeed,” I said, “if indeed justice is wisdom and virtue, I think it will easily appear also stronger than injustice, since indeed injustice is ignorance—no one could still be ignorant of this—but I do not wish to examine it so simply, Thrasymachus, but in this sort of way: would you say that an unjust city exists, and that it attempts to enslave other cities unjustly and has enslaved them, and holds many indeed under itself having enslaved them?” “How indeed could I not?” he said. “And the best city indeed, being most completely unjust, will especially do this.” “I understand,” I said, “that this was your argument. But I am considering this about it: whether the city that becomes stronger than another city will have this power without justice, or is it necessary for it to have it with justice?” ”If,” he said, “it is as you were saying just now—that justice is wisdom—with justice; but if as I was saying, with injustice.” “I am very delighted, Thrasymachus,” I said, “that you do not only nod and shake your head, but also answer very beautifully.” “For I am doing it to please you,” he said. “You are doing very well indeed; but indeed please me also in this and tell me: do you think either a city, or an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group, as many as go together for some unjust purpose, would be able to achieve anything if they were to act unjustly toward one another?” ”Not at all,” he said. “And what if they were not to act unjustly? Would they not achieve more?” “Certainly.” “For injustice surely, Thrasymachus, produces factions and hatreds and battles among one another, while justice produces unanimity and friendship. Is that not so?” “Let it be so,” he said, “so that I may not disagree with you.” “You are doing very well indeed, my excellent friend. But tell me this: if this is the work of injustice, to produce hatred wherever it is present, will it not, when it arises both among free men and slaves, make them hate one another and engage in faction, and be unable to act in common with one another?” “Certainly.” “And what if it should arise in two? Will they not differ and hate and be enemies both to one another and to the just?” “They will be,” he said. “But indeed, my wonderful friend, if injustice should arise in one person, will it lose its own power, or will it hold it no less?” “Let it hold it no less,” he said.