- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg027.humanitext-grc2:532
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-26
Socrates argues that the ability to judge both good and bad speakers on a topic arises from the same art, indicating that Ion's specific talent for Homer is not based on actual artistic knowledge. While agreeing, Ion asks why he only becomes engaged with Homer, leading Socrates to begin an explanation using other general arts like painting as examples.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς γνώσεται ἀεί, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλῶν λεγόντων,1 ὅστις τε εὖ λέγει καὶ ὅστις κακῶς· ἢ εἰ μὴ γνώσεται τὸν κακῶς λέγοντα, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν εὖ, περί γε τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ΙΩΝ. οὕτως. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς γίγνεται δεινὸς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων; ΙΩΝ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σὺ φῂς καὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητάς, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ἀρχίλοχός ἐστιν, περί γε τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν εὖ γε, τοὺς δὲ χεῖρον; ΙΩΝ. καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ τὸν εὖ λέγοντα γιγνώσκεις, καὶ τοὺς χεῖρον λέγοντας γιγνώσκοις ἂν ὅτι χεῖρον λέγουσιν. ΙΩΝ. ἔοικέν γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὁμοίως τὸν Ἴωνα λέγοντες περὶ Ὁμήρου τε δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν2 οὐχ ἁμαρτησόμεθα, ἐπειδή γε αὐτὸς ὁμολογῇ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι κριτὴν ἱκανὸν πάντων ὅσοι ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγωσι, τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. ΙΩΝ. τί οὖν ποτε τὸ αἴτιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν μέν τις περὶ ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ διαλέγηται, οὔτε προσέχω τὸν νοῦν ἀδυνατῶ τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν συμβαλέσθαι λόγου ἄξιον, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς νυστάζω, ἐπειδὰν δέ τις περὶ Ὁμήρου μνησθῇ, εὐθύς τε ἐγρήγορα καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν καὶ εὐπορῶ ὅτι λέγω; ΣΩ. οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτό γε εἰκάσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγειν ἀδύνατος εἶ·3 εἰ γὰρ τέχνῃ οἷός τε ἦσθα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν ἁπάντων λέγειν οἷός τʼ ἂν ἦσθα· ποιητικὴ γάρ πού ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον. ἢ οὔ; ΙΩΝ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ὅλην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεως ἔσται περὶ ἁπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν; πῶς τοῦτο λέγω, δέῃ τί μου ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Ἴων; ΙΩΝ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε· χαίρω γὰρ ἀκούων ὑμῶν τῶν σοφῶν. ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἄν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων· ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ μέν πού ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ᾁδετε τὰ ποιήματα, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τἀληθῆ λέγω, οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τούτου οὗ νῦν ἠρόμην σε, θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι ὃ ἔλεγον, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σκέψιν, ἐπειδάν τις ὅλην τέχνην λάβῃ. λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ· γραφικὴ γάρ τίς ἐστι τέχνη τὸ ὅλον; ΙΩΝ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ γραφῆς πολλοὶ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασιν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι; ΙΩΝ. πάνυ γε.
SOC: Well then, to sum it up, do we say that when many are speaking about the same things, the same person will always recognize both who speaks well and who speaks badly? Or if he does not recognize the one who speaks badly, is it clear that he will not recognize the one who speaks well either, at least regarding the same subject? ION: That is so. SOC: Is it not true, then, that the same person becomes skilled in both? ION: Yes. SOC: And do you not say that Homer and the other poets, among whom are Hesiod and Archilochus, speak about the same things, but not in the same way, but rather he speaks well, while they speak worse? ION: Yes, and I speak the truth. SOC: Then, if you recognize the one who speaks well, you would also recognize those who speak worse, that they speak worse. ION: It seems so. SOC: Therefore, my excellent friend, we shall not be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in both Homer and the other poets, since you yourself agree that the same person will be an adequate judge of all who speak about the same things, and that the poets almost all compose on the same subjects. ION: What then could be the reason, Socrates, that when anyone discusses another poet, I pay no attention and am unable to contribute anything of value, but simply doze off, but when anyone mentions Homer, I am immediately awake and pay attention and have plenty to say? SOC: It is not difficult to guess this, my friend. Rather, it is clear to everyone that you are unable to speak about Homer by art and knowledge; for if you were able to do so by art, you would also be able to speak about all the other poets. For the art of poetry, I suppose, is a whole. Is it not? ION: Yes. SOC: Then, when one grasps any other art as a whole, will not the same method of inquiry apply to all arts? Do you need to hear from me how I mean this, Ion? ION: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I certainly do; for I enjoy listening to you wise men. SOC: I wish you were speaking the truth, Ion. But it is you rhapsodes and actors, and those whose poems you sing, who are wise, whereas I speak nothing but the truth, as is fitting for a common man. For consider even this which I just asked you, how common and simple it is, and for any man to know what I meant—that the inquiry is the same when one grasps an art as a whole. Let us take it in our discussion: is painting as a whole a certain art? ION: Yes. SOC: And are there not, and have there not been, many painters, both good and bad? ION: Certainly.
- 532περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλῶν λεγόντων
A genitive absolute construction expressing time or condition ("when many people speak about the same things"), where πολλῶν functions as the subject of the participle λεγόντων.
- 532bὁμοίως τὸν Ἴωνα λέγοντες περὶ Ὁμήρου τε δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν
The participle λέγοντες (agreeing with the implied subject 'we') takes an accusative with infinitive (A.C.I.) construction, in which τὸν Ἴωνα is the subject of the infinitive εἶναι, and δεινὸν is its predicate adjective. The adverb ὁμοίως modifies the assertion that Ion is skilled in both Homer and other poets.
- 532cἀδύνατος εἶ
Instead of the impersonal construction ἀδύνατόν ἐστι ("it is impossible") with an accusative and infinitive, this is a personal construction influenced by δῆλον ὅτι ("it is clear that"), where the adjective ἀδύνατος agrees directly in gender, number, and case with the subject "you" (implied in εἶ).