- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:459
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Socrates leads Gorgias to admit that rhetoric is merely a device allowing an ignorant person to appear more persuasive than an expert among an ignorant audience, and then questions whether this also applies to moral values like justice, beauty, and goodness, or if a student must already know the truth of these matters before learning rhetoric.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστʼ ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;1 ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ. ΓΟΡ. καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. δῆλον ὅτι. ΣΩ. ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει,2 μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων. ΓΟΡ. οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς3 ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον4—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δʼ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθʼ ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: Then is it about all subjects so as to be persuasive among the crowd, not by teaching but by persuading? GORGIAS: Exactly so. SOCRATES: You were saying just now, you know, that even concerning what is healthy the rhetorician will be more persuasive than the physician. GORGIAS: Yes, I was indeed saying so, among the crowd at least. SOCRATES: Then this ‘among the crowd’ is among those who do not know? For surely among those who know, he will not be more persuasive than the physician. GORGIAS: You speak the truth. SOCRATES: Then if indeed he is to be more persuasive than the physician, he becomes more persuasive than the one who knows? GORGIAS: Quite so. SOCRATES: Not being a physician, at any rate; is that not so? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the non-physician, surely, is ignorant of those things of which the physician is knowledgeable. GORGIAS: Clearly so. SOCRATES: The one who does not know, therefore, will be more persuasive than the one who knows among those who do not know, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician. Is this what happens, or something else? GORGIAS: This is indeed what happens in this case. SOCRATES: Then is it also the same way for the rhetorician and rhetoric concerning all other arts? There is no need for it to know the things themselves as they are, but only to have found some device of persuasion so as to appear to those who do not know to know more than those who do know. GORGIAS: Then is it not a great ease, Socrates, not to have learned the other arts but only this one, and yet to be at no disadvantage compared to the craftsmen? SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is at a disadvantage or not compared to the others because of being in this state, we shall examine presently, if it is of any use to our argument; but now let us first examine this: whether the rhetorician happens to be in the same state regarding the just and the unjust, the shameful and the beautiful, the good and the bad, as he is regarding what is healthy and the other things of which the other arts are; not knowing the things themselves—what is good or what is bad, or what is beautiful or what is shameful, or just or unjust—but having devised a persuasion about them so that, not knowing, he seems to those who do not know to know more than the one who knows? Or is it necessary to know them, and must the one who is going to learn rhetoric arrive at your place already knowing these things beforehand? Or if not, will you, the teacher of rhetoric, teach the newcomer none of these things—for that is not your task—but will you make him seem to the many to know such things when he does not know them, and seem to be a good man when he is not? Or will you be altogether unable to teach him rhetoric if he does not know the truth about these things beforehand? Or how do such matters stand, Gorgias? And by Zeus, just as you said just now, reveal the power of rhetoric and tell us what on earth it is.
- 459οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα
The accusative participles διδάσκοντα and πείθοντα agree with the implicit accusative subject of the infinitive εἶναι in the preceding ὥστε clause (the learner/rhetorician). The result clause structure means "so that [the rhetorician] is persuasive among the crowd, not by teaching but by persuading."
- 459bαὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει
The pronoun αὐτήν is a feminine singular accusative referring to 'rhetoric' (ἡ ῥητορική), acting as the subject of the infinitive εἰδέναι in the impersonal construction with δεῖ. The phrase αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα ... ὅπως ἔχει functions as a proleptic structure, meaning 'how the things themselves are'.
- 459dτυγχάνει ... οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς
A standard participial construction where the verb τυγχάνω is paired with the nominative participle ἔχων (οὕτως ἔχων meaning 'being in such a state'), meaning 'happens to be' or 'is actually'. The subject is ὁ ῥητορικός (the rhetorician).
- 459eεἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον
The phrase εἰ δὲ μή is an idiom meaning 'but if not' (i.e., 'if they do not arrive already knowing these things'). The verb διδάξεις takes a double accusative: the person (τὸν ἀφικνούμενον, 'the newcomer') and the thing (τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, 'none of these things').