- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:450
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Socrates points out that medicine and gymnastics also involve "speeches" and asks for the distinction. Gorgias explains that while other arts involve manual work, the activity and validity of rhetoric are entirely through speech.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν,1 ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν. ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. μάλιστα. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους,2 εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἣ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν3 περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτʼ ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλʼ ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις,4 εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.
SOCRATES: Does medicine then, which we were just mentioning, make men capable of thinking and speaking about the sick? GORGIAS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: Then medicine too, it seems, is about speeches. GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Those, at least, about diseases? GORGIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And gymnastic too is about speeches, those concerning the good and bad condition of bodies? GORGIAS: Quite so. SOCRATES: And indeed, the other arts too, Gorgias, are in this state; each of them is about those speeches which happen to be about the subject matter of which each is the art. GORGIAS: So it appears. SOCRATES: Why on earth then do you not call the other arts rhetoric, when they are about speeches, if indeed you call this one rhetoric which is about speeches? GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, of the other arts, almost the whole of their knowledge is about manual work and such activities, whereas of rhetoric there is no such manual work, but its whole activity and validity are through speeches . For these reasons, I claim that the art of rhetoric is about speeches, speaking correctly, as I maintain. SOCRATES: Do I then understand what sort of art you wish to call it? But soon I shall know more clearly. Answer me: we have arts, do we not? GORGIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Now of all the arts, I think, some consist mostly in work and need little speech, and some need none at all, but the end of the art might be accomplished even through silence, such as painting and sculpture and many others. It is such arts that you seem to me to speak of, about which you say rhetoric is not; or is it not? GORGIAS: You understand it perfectly well, Socrates. SOCRATES: But on the other hand, there are other arts which accomplish everything through speech, and need, so to speak, either no work or very little, such as arithmetic, calculation, geometry, draughts, and many other arts; some of which have their speeches almost equal to their actions, but most of them have more, and altogether their whole activity and validity are through speeches. It is one of this sort of arts that you seem to me to call rhetoric. GORGIAS: You speak the truth. SOCRATES: But yet I do not think you want to call any of these rhetoric, not because you said so in words—that the art which has its validity through speech is rhetoric—so that someone, if he wished to be captious in argument, might object: “Do you then, Gorgias, call arithmetic rhetoric?” But I do not think you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.
- 450aἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν
The antecedent ἡ ἰατρικὴ (medicine) is placed as the subject of the main clause, while the relative pronoun ἣν remains in the accusative as the object of ἐλέγομεν (we were mentioning).
- 450bοὔσας περὶ λόγους
The participle οὔσας represents concession ("although they are about speeches") or a simple circumstantial participle.
- 450bτῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν
This can be interpreted as a partitive genitive, or as a genitive of connection modifying πᾶσα ἡ ἐπιστήμη (almost the whole of their knowledge). It functions to introduce the topic: "as for the other arts, almost the whole of their knowledge...".
- 450eοὐχ ὅτι... καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις
The phrase οὐχ ὅτι introduces a denied reason ("not because..."), followed by καί and the optative with ἄν (ὑπολάβοι ἄν) to express potentiality. It forestalls a potential captious objection: "not because you said so in words... and [if one were to take it that way] someone might suppose...".