Euthydemus

​SOCRATES: “I myself indeed, Crito, since I had fallen into this difficulty, was by then letting clear every cry, begging the two strangers and calling upon them as if they were the Dioscuri to save us—both myself and the youth—from the triple wave of the argument, and by all means to be serious, and having become serious to display what on earth is that knowledge by acquiring which we might beautifully pass the remainder of our life.” CRITO: “What happened then? Was Euthydemus willing to display anything to you?” SOCRATES: “How could he not? And indeed, my friend, he began his argument very magnanimously in this way— ‘Socrates,’ he said, ‘should I teach you this knowledge, about which you have long been in difficulty, or should I display you as already possessing it?’ ‘My good sir,’ I said, ‘is that really in your power?’ ‘Very much so indeed,’ he said. ‘Then by Zeus, display me as possessing it,’ I said, ‘for that is much easier than for a man of my age to learn.’ ‘Come then, answer me,’ he said; ‘is there anything that you know?’ —‘Certainly,’ I said, ‘and many things, though small ones.’— ‘That’s enough,’ he said. ‘Do you then think it possible for any of the things that are, this very thing which happens to be, not to be this very thing?’ —‘By Zeus, I certainly do not.’— ‘Therefore,’ he said, ‘you know something?’ —‘I do.’— ‘Therefore you are knowing, if indeed you know?’ —‘Certainly, of this very thing at least.’— ‘That makes no difference. But is it not necessary for you, being knowing, to know all things?’ —‘By Zeus, no,’ I said, ‘since there are many other things I do not know.’— ‘Therefore, if you do not know something, you are not knowing.’ —‘Of that thing, indeed, my friend,’ I said.— ‘Are you then any the less,’ he said, ‘not knowing? But just now you said you were knowing; and so you happen to be this very same person who you are, and again on the other hand not to be so, at the same time and in the same respect.’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘Euthydemus; as the saying goes, you certainly make a fine clatter. How then do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since, indeed, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, if indeed I know one thing, I know all things—for I could not be both knowing and not knowing at the same time—and since I know all things, I also possess that very knowledge. Is this what you mean, and is this where the wisdom lies?’ ‘You are indeed refuting yourself, Socrates,’ he said. ‘But what about you,’ I said, ‘Euthydemus? Have you not suffered this very same thing? For I assure you, if I suffer anything whatsoever along with you and this Dionysodorus here, my dear friend, I should not be very displeased. Tell me, do you two not know some of the things that are, while not knowing others?’ ‘Not in the least,’ said Dionysodorus, ‘Socrates.’ ‘How do you two mean?’ I said. ‘Do you then know nothing at all?’ ‘On the contrary, very much so,’ he said.