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Phaedrus

§264-265

Organic Unity of Discourse and Collection into One

Socrates criticizes Lysias' speech for its lack of organic unity and order, pointing out that it begins from the end and is structured at random. He then looks back at their own speeches and begins to explain the first of the two dialectical methods (collection and division) necessary for rhetoric, which is gathering scattered particulars into a single defined idea.

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§264

ΦΑΙ. περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· — ΣΩ. ἦ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν1 ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἀφʼ ὧν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἤδη ὁ ἐραστὴς λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν εἶπον, Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή; ΦΑΙ. ἔστιν γέ τοι δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. ΣΩ. τί δὲ τἆλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι, ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι,2 οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῷ γράφοντι· σὺ δʼ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρʼ ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν; ΦΑΙ. χρηστὸς εἶ, ὅτι με ἡγῇ ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διιδεῖν. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. ΦΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. σκέψαι τοίνυν τὸν τοῦ ἑταίρου σου λόγον εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, καὶ εὑρήσεις τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδᾳ τῷ Φρυγί φασίν τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι. ΦΑΙ. ποῖον τοῦτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός; ΣΩ. ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τόδε— "χαλκῆ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δʼ ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι. ὄφρʼ ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάῃ καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλῃ, αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου, ἀγγελέω παριοῦσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαπται." ὅτι δʼ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς που, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. ΦΑΙ. σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἄχθῃ, ἐάσωμεν— καίτοι συχνά γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα πρὸς ἅ τις βλέπων ὀνίναιτʼ ἄν, μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνυ τι— εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους ἴωμεν. ἦν γάρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς δοκῶ, προσῆκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων σκοπεῖν.

​PHAEDRUS: “Concerning my affairs you understand, and you have heard how I think it is advantageous for us if these things come about. And I claim that I should not fail to get what I ask for this reason, that I happen not to be a lover of yours. For to those, on the one hand, there is regret then for the things they have done well, whenever they cease from their desire —“ SOCRATES: Indeed, this man seems to be very far from doing what we seek, since he attempts to swim through his speech backward on his back, not from the beginning but from the end, and starts from what the lover would say to his beloved only after he had already ceased loving. Or did I say nothing, Phaedrus, dear head? PHAEDRUS: To be sure, Socrates, that about which he makes his speech is indeed an end. SOCRATES: And what about the rest? Do not the parts of the speech seem to be thrown together at random? Or does it appear that what is said second had to be placed second out of some necessity, or any other of the things spoken? For to me, who know nothing, it seemed that the writer stated what came into his mind not without spirit; but do you have some speech-writing necessity by which he placed these things next to one another in such sequence? PHAEDRUS: You are very kind to think me capable of examining his writings so accurately. SOCRATES: But this, at least, I think you would say: that every speech must be composed like a living being, having a body of its own, so as to be neither headless nor footless, but to have middle parts and extremities, written so as to suit one another and the whole. PHAEDRUS: How could it not be so? SOCRATES: Examine then the speech of your companion, whether it is in this way or otherwise, and you will find that it differs in no way from the epigram which some say is inscribed for Midas the Phrygian. PHAEDRUS: What kind of epigram is this, and what is the matter with it? SOCRATES: It is indeed this: “A bronze maiden am I, and on Midas’ tomb I lie. As long as water flows and tall trees grow green, Remaining here on this much-lamented tomb, I shall announce to those passing by that Midas is buried here.” That it makes no difference whether any part of it is said first or last, you perceive, I think. PHAEDRUS: You are making fun of our speech, Socrates. SOCRATES: Let us, then, leave this speech, so that you may not be vexed—although it seems to me to contain plenty of examples by looking at which one might benefit, provided one does not try at all to imitate them—and let us go on to the other speeches. For there was in them, as I think, something appropriate to examine for those who wish to consider speeches.

§265

ΦΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. ἐναντίω που ἤστην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς τῷ ἐρῶντι, ὁ δʼ ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην. ΦΑΙ. καὶ μάλʼ ἀνδρικῶς. ΣΩ. ὤιμην σε τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖν, ὅτι μανικῶς· ὃ μέντοι ἐζήτουν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα. ἦ γάρ; ΦΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. ΦΑΙ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι,3 μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δʼ αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δʼ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες4 οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον. ΦΑΙ. καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι. ΣΩ. τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι. ΦΑΙ. πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις; ΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι· τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι. ΦΑΙ. τίνων δή; ΣΩ. εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. ὥσπερ τὰ νυνδὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος—ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν—εἴτʼ εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη, τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος. ΦΑΙ. τὸ δʼ ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

PHAEDRUS: What kind of thing indeed do you mean? SOCRATES: They were, I suppose, opposite to each other; for the one said that favor should be given to the lover, and the other to the non-lover. PHAEDRUS: And very vigorously indeed. SOCRATES: I thought you were going to say the truth, namely ‘madly’; however, what I was seeking is this very thing. For we said that love is a certain madness. Is it not so? PHAEDRUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And there are two kinds of madness, one arising from human diseases, the other from a divine release from customary conventions. PHAEDRUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And having divided the divine madness into four parts belonging to four gods—attributing prophetic inspiration to Apollo, mystic initiation to Dionysus, and again poetic madness to the Muses, and the fourth to Aphrodite and Eros, we said that the madness of love is the best, and, in some way portraying the passion of love, perhaps touching upon some truth, and fast-drifting maybe also in another direction, blending a not altogether unconvincing speech, we sang a playful, mythical hymn in a moderate and auspicious way to honor your master and mine, Phaedrus—namely Eros, the guardian of beautiful boys. PHAEDRUS: And indeed, it was not at all unpleasant for me to hear. SOCRATES: Let us, then, grasp this from the matter itself: how the speech was able to shift from blaming to praising. PHAEDRUS: How indeed do you mean this? SOCRATES: To me indeed, the other parts seem to have been played in real play; but of certain things spoken by chance, if one could grasp by art the power of two classes, it would not be without grace. PHAEDRUS: What are they indeed? SOCRATES: One is to bring together things scattered in many places, looking at them as one idea, so that by defining each, one makes clear whatever one wishes to teach on each occasion. Just as what was said just now about Love—which, having been defined, whether well or badly—at any rate, because of this, the speech was able to state it with clarity and internal consistency. PHAEDRUS: And what indeed do you say the other class is, Socrates?

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 264aἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν

    Meaning "to swim across backward on one's back." ἐξ ὑπτίας is an adverbial expression derived from the adjective ὕπτιος (backwards, on one's back), referring to backstroke swimming. διανεῖν is the active present infinitive of διανέω (to swim across). This vividly illustrates how the speech's structure reverses the natural order of "beginning to end" by starting from the conclusion, using the metaphor of swimming backward.

  2. 264bὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι

    The dative participle εἰδότι (perfect active participle dative singular masculine of οἶδα) accompanied by ὡς. It agrees with ἐμοί (to me) in the main clause, expressing a subjective or qualifying nuance, "as one who knows nothing."

  3. 265bτῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι

    τῆς δὲ θείας is a genitive (partitive genitive or dependent on διελόμενοι) referring back to the preceding μανίας. It translates as "having divided the divine madness into four parts belonging to four gods." διελόμενοι is the aorist middle participle of διαιρέω, describing the dialectical activity of the speakers and leading to the main verb προσεπαίσαμεν.

  4. 265bἀπεικάζοντες ... ἐφαπτόμενοι ... παραφερόμενοι ... κεράσαντες

    A long syntactic structure where multiple nominative participles modify the main verb of the clause, προσεπαίσαμεν (we offered in play). ἀπεικάζοντες (portraying), ἐφαπτόμενοι (touching), and παραφερόμενοι (drifting away) are present participles describing simultaneous states, while κεράσαντες (having blended) is an aorist participle describing the prior preparation before offering the hymn.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg012.humanitext-grc2:264-265