Phaedrus

PHAEDRUS: In those that differ little. SOCRATES: But indeed, by shifting little by little, you will more escape notice in arriving at the opposite than by shifting in a big way. PHAEDRUS: How could it not be so? SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who is going to deceive another, but not be deceived himself, must accurately distinguish the similarity and dissimilarity of things that are. PHAEDRUS: It is indeed necessary. SOCRATES: Will he then be able, if he is ignorant of the truth of each thing, to discern the similarity of the unknown thing, whether small or great, in other things? PHAEDRUS: Impossible. SOCRATES: Therefore, for those who hold opinions contrary to the things that are and are deceived, it is clear that this affection has crept in through certain similarities. PHAEDRUS: At any rate, it happens in this way. SOCRATES: Is there then any way that one will be skilled in shifting by small degrees through similarities, leading away from what is on each occasion to the opposite, or in escaping this himself, if he has not recognized what each of the things that are is? PHAEDRUS: Never indeed. SOCRATES: Therefore, my companion, the one who does not know the truth, but has hunted after opinions, will offer an art of speeches that is, as it seems, a ridiculous and artless one. PHAEDRUS: It is likely. SOCRATES: Do you wish, then, in the speech of Lysias which you are carrying, and in those which we spoke, to see something of what we say is artless and artful? PHAEDRUS: Most of all, surely, since as it is we are speaking in a rather bare way, not having sufficient examples. SOCRATES: And indeed by some chance, as it seems, the two speeches were spoken containing an example of how one who knows the truth, playing in words, might mislead his hearers. And I, Phaedrus, blame the local gods; and perhaps also the prophets of the Muses, the singers above our heads, might have inspired us with this gift; for surely I myself have no share in any art of speaking. PHAEDRUS: Let it be as you say; only make clear what you mean. SOCRATES: Come then, read to me the beginning of Lysias’ speech. PHAEDRUS: “Concerning my affairs you understand, and you have heard how I think it is advantageous for us if these things come about. And I claim that I should not fail to get what I ask for this reason, that I happen not to be a lover of yours. For to those, on the one hand, there is regret then —“ SOCRATES: Stop. Now we must state in what indeed this man errs and acts without art; is it not so?

PHAEDRUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Is it not, then, clear to everyone at least this much, that concerning some of such things we are in agreement, but concerning others we are in conflict? PHAEDRUS: I think indeed I understand what you mean, but state it still more clearly. SOCRATES: When someone utters the name of “iron” or “silver,” do we not all think of the same thing? PHAEDRUS: Very much so. SOCRATES: But what when someone utters “just” or “good”? Is not one carried in one direction and another in another, and do we not dispute with one another and with our own selves? PHAEDRUS: Entirely so. SOCRATES: In some of these things, therefore, we agree, but in others we do not. PHAEDRUS: Just so. SOCRATES: In which of the two, then, are we more easily deceived, and in which does rhetoric have greater power? PHAEDRUS: Clearly in those in which we wander. SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who is going to pursue the art of rhetoric must first have systematically divided these things, and have grasped some characteristic of each of the two kinds—both that in which the multitude must wander and that in which they do not. PHAEDRUS: A beautiful class, at any rate, Socrates, would he have understood, the one who has grasped this. SOCRATES: Then, I think, as he comes to each case, he must not fail to notice but must sharply perceive to which of the two genera the thing about which he is going to speak happens to belong. PHAEDRUS: Why indeed not? SOCRATES: What then? Shall we say that love is one of the disputed things or of the undisputed? PHAEDRUS: Of the disputed ones, surely; or do you think it would have been permitted to you to say what you said just now about it, that it is a harm both to the beloved and to the lover, and again that it happens to be the greatest of goods? SOCRATES: Most excellently said; but tell me also this—for indeed, owing to my inspired state, I do not quite remember—whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech. PHAEDRUS: Yes, by Zeus, extraordinarily so! SOCRATES: Alas! By how much more artful do you say the Nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in speeches than Lysias, son of Cephalus. Or am I talking nonsense, and did Lysias also, at the beginning of his love-speech, compel us to conceive of love as some single thing among those that are, which he himself wished, and then, having arranged everything in relation to this, complete all the subsequent speech? Do you wish us to read his beginning again? PHAEDRUS: If it seems good to you; however, what you are seeking is not there. SOCRATES: Read, so that I may hear him himself.