Theaetetus

​SOCRATES: But what about Protagoras himself? Is it not necessary, if neither he himself thought man is the measure, nor the multitude—as indeed they do not—that this ‘Truth’ which he wrote exists for no one? And if he himself thought so, but the multitude does not agree, do you know that, first of all, by as much as those to whom it does not seem so are more numerous than those to whom it does, by so much more it is not than it is? THEODORUS: It must be so, if indeed it will be and will not be according to each opinion. SOCRATES: Then, indeed, it has this most elegant feature: regarding his own opinion, he concedes that the opinion of those who oppose him—by which they believe him to be false—is true, since he agrees that all believe what is the case. THEODORUS: Yes, absolutely. SOCRATES: Therefore, would he not concede that his own is false, if he agrees that the opinion of those who believe him to be false is true? THEODORUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: But do the others not concede that they themselves are false? THEODORUS: No, indeed they do not. SOCRATES: But he, on the other hand, agrees that this opinion too is true, from what he has written. THEODORUS: So it seems. SOCRATES: Therefore, it will be disputed by all, beginning with Protagoras—or rather, it will be agreed by him, when he concedes to the one saying the opposite that he believes what is true, then Protagoras himself will also concede that neither a dog nor any random man is the measure regarding any single thing which he has not learned. Is it not so? THEODORUS: It is so. SOCRATES: Therefore, since it is disputed by all, the Truth of Protagoras would not be true for anyone, neither for any other nor for himself. THEODORUS: Socrates, we are running down my friend too much. SOCRATES: But, my friend, it is unclear whether we are also running past what is right. It is likely indeed that he, being older, is wiser than us; and if he should suddenly pop up from here as far as his neck, he would probably accuse me of talking nonsense, as is likely, and you of agreeing, and then sink down and run off. But it is necessary for us, I think, to use ourselves such as we are, and always to say what seems to be. And indeed, even now, shall we say that anyone whatsoever would agree to this, namely, that one person is wiser than another, and also more ignorant? THEODORUS: To me at least it seems so. SOCRATES: And would the argument stand firmest in this way, in which we sketched it out when helping Protagoras, namely, that for the most part, in the way it seems to each, in that way it also is for him—hot, dry, sweet, and all things of this type; but if it is to be conceded that in some things one differs from another, he would be willing to say regarding what is healthy and diseased that not every woman and child, and indeed beast, is capable of healing itself by knowing what is healthy for itself, but here indeed one differs from another, if indeed anywhere? THEODORUS: To me at least it seems so.