Theaetetus

​SOCRATES: But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, then, think that I must defend your deceased companion in every way while you defend him in no way. But come, my excellent friend, follow a little way, until this very point, until we know whether you indeed must be the measure regarding geometrical diagrams, or whether all are equally as capable as you for themselves in astronomy and the other things in which you indeed have the reputation of being outstanding. THEODORUS: It is not easy, Socrates, sitting beside you, not to give an account; but I was just now talking nonsense when I said you would permit me not to strip, and not force me like the Lacedaemonians; but you seem to me to lean rather toward Sciron . For the Lacedaemonians bid one either depart or strip, but you seem to me to act the drama rather like Antaeus; for you do not let go of whoever comes near until you force him to strip and wrestle with you in arguments. SOCRATES: Excellently indeed, Theodorus, have you likened my disease; however, I am more robust than they. For countless Heracleses and Theseuses, strong in speaking, have met me and soundly thrashed me, but I do not withdraw any the more; so terrible a passion for gymnastics about these things has entered into me. Do not, therefore, grudge rubbing yourself against me and thereby helping both yourself and me. THEODORUS: I no longer object, but lead wherever you wish; in any case, whatever fate you spin about these things must be endured by being refuted. However, I shall not be able to offer myself to you any further than what you propose. SOCRATES: But it is enough even up to these things. And watch this very carefully for me, lest we somehow make a childish form of arguments without noticing, and someone reproach us for it again. THEODORUS: Well, I shall try, as far as I am able. SOCRATES: Let us then first take hold again of this very point as before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased when we censured his argument because it made each person self-sufficient in wisdom, and yet Protagoras conceded to us that some people differ in respect to the better and the worse, who indeed are the wise. Is it not so? THEODORUS: Yes. SOCRATES: If, then, he himself were present and agreed, instead of us conceding on his behalf to help him, there would be no need to take it up again and confirm it; but now perhaps someone might render us unauthorized in our agreement on his behalf. Therefore, it is better to agree more clearly about this very thing; for it makes no small difference whether it is thus or otherwise. THEODORUS: You speak the truth.

​SOCRATES: Therefore, let us obtain the agreement not through others, but from his own argument in the briefest possible way. THEODORUS: How? SOCRATES: In this way: does he not say that what seems to each person, this also is for the one to whom it seems? THEODORUS: To be sure he does. SOCRATES: Do we not then, Protagoras, speak of the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and say that there is no one who does not believe himself wiser than others in some things, and others wiser than himself in other things? And indeed in the greatest dangers, when they are storm-tossed in military campaigns or illnesses or at sea, they look to those who rule in each situation as to gods, expecting them to be their saviors, differing in nothing else than in knowing; and all human affairs are surely full of those seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other animals and of works, and on the other hand, of those believing they are capable of teaching and capable of ruling. And in all these cases, what else shall we say but that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist among them? THEODORUS: Nothing else. SOCRATES: Do they not then believe wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion? THEODORUS: Of course. SOCRATES: What then, Protagoras, shall we do with the argument? Shall we say that men always hold true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For from both positions, surely, it follows that they do not always hold true opinions, but both. For consider, Theodorus, if any of those around Protagoras, or you yourself, would be willing to contend that no one believes another to be ignorant and to hold false opinions. THEODORUS: But that is incredible, Socrates. SOCRATES: And yet, the argument that says ‘man is the measure of all things’ arrives at this very necessity. THEODORUS: How so? SOCRATES: Whenever you, having judged something by yourself, declare to me an opinion about something, let this indeed be true for you according to his argument; but for us, the others, is it not possible to become judges about your judgment, or do we always judge that you hold true opinions? Or do countless people on each occasion fight you, holding opposite opinions, believing that you judge and think falsely? THEODORUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, very many indeed, as Homer says, who provide me with human troubles. SOCRATES: What then? Do you wish us to say that you then hold true opinions for yourself, but false for the countless ones? THEODORUS: It seems to be necessary from the argument, at least.