Theaetetus

​SOCRATES: But now, I think, if we care at all about the likeness of our faces, we must examine whether he speaks as a painter or not. THEAETETUS: So it seems to me. SOCRATES: Is Theodorus, then, a painter? THEAETETUS: No, not so far as I know. SOCRATES: And is he not a geometer either? THEAETETUS: Most certainly he is, Socrates. SOCRATES: And is he also an astronomer, a calculator, a musician, and versed in all that belongs to education? THEAETETUS: So it seems to me. SOCRATES: If, then, he says we are alike in some part of our body, praising or blaming it in some way, it is not very well worth while to pay attention to him. THEAETETUS: Perhaps not. SOCRATES: But what if he should praise the soul of either of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the hearer to be eager to examine the one who is praised, and for the other to show himself eagerly? THEAETETUS: By all means, Socrates. SOCRATES: Now, then, my dear Theaetetus, is the time for you to show yourself and for me to examine you; for you may be sure that though Theodorus has praised many men to me, both strangers and citizens, he has never praised anyone as he just now praised you. THEAETETUS: I should be glad of that, Socrates; but see that he was not speaking in jest . SOCRATES: That is not Theodorus’s way. Do not back out of our agreement, then, on the pretext that he was speaking in jest, lest he be forced to bear witness—for certainly no one will prosecute him for perjury—but abide by your agreement with courage. THEAETETUS: Well, so I must do, if you think so. SOCRATES: Tell me, then: you learn some geometry from Theodorus, I suppose? THEAETETUS: I do. SOCRATES: And also things concerning astronomy, harmony, and calculations? THEAETETUS: I certainly try my best. SOCRATES: So do I, my boy, both from him and from others whom I think understand any of these things. Yet, although I am moderately well versed in these matters, I am a little puzzled about one small point, which we must examine with you and these others. Tell me: is not learning becoming wiser about that which one learns? THEAETETUS: Of course it is. SOCRATES: And it is by wisdom, I suppose, that wise people are wise? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But is this any different from knowledge? THEAETETUS: What do you mean? SOCRATES: Wisdom. Or are not people wise in just those things of which they have knowledge? THEAETETUS: Of course. SOCRATES: Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing? THEAETETUS: Yes.

​SOCRATES: This, then, is the very thing I am puzzled about and cannot sufficiently grasp by myself: what knowledge actually is. Can we, then, state it? What do you all say? Who of us will speak first? He who makes a mistake, and whoever keeps making mistakes, shall sit down as the ‘donkey,’ as the children playing ball say; but whoever comes through without making a mistake shall be our king and shall order us to answer whatever he pleases. Why are you silent? Surely, Theodorus, I am not behaving rudely because of my love of talk, in my eagerness to make us converse and become friends and talkative with one another? THEODORUS: By no means, Socrates, would such a thing be rude. But bid one of the youths answer you; for I am unaccustomed to this kind of discussion, and moreover, I am not of an age to get used to it. But for them, this would be suitable and they would improve far more; for indeed, youth is capable of improvement in everything. So, as you began, do not let Theaetetus off, but question him. SOCRATES: You hear, then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says, whom you will not, I think, wish to disobey, nor is it right for a younger man to disobey a wise man when he commands in such matters. Speak, then, well and nobly: what do you think knowledge is? THEAETETUS: Well, I must do so, Socrates, since you both command it. For in any case, if I make a mistake, you will correct me. SOCRATES: By all means, if we are able. THEAETETUS: Well, then, it seems to me that the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledges—geometry and the ones you just went through— and again, shoemaking and the crafts of the other artisans, all and each of these are nothing else than knowledge. SOCRATES: Nobly and generously indeed, my friend! When asked for one thing, you give many and various things instead of a simple one. THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that, Socrates? SOCRATES: Perhaps it is nothing; but I will tell you what I think. When you say ‘shoemaking,’ do you mean anything else than the knowledge of making shoes? THEAETETUS: Nothing. SOCRATES: And what when you say ‘carpentry’? Anything else than the knowledge of making wooden utensils? THEAETETUS: Not that either. SOCRATES: Therefore, in both cases, you define that of which each is the knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But, Theaetetus, what was asked was not this, what things knowledge is of, nor how many knowledges there are; for we did not ask because we wanted to count them, but to know what knowledge itself actually is. Or am I talking nonsense? THEAETETUS: No, you are entirely right.