Aegineticus

​For I think that, if he should perceive what kind of person she has been toward his children, he would become the harshest judge of all to her. He would be far from being displeased if you vote according to the laws; rather, he would be much more so if he should see his children’s wills made void. For if Thrasylochus had given his estate to my house, they might have reason to reproach him; but as it is, he adopted me into their own house, so that they happen to have received no less than they have given. Apart from these things, ​it is natural for no one more than Thrasyllus to be well-disposed to those who make claims under a bequest; for he himself both learned his art from Polemaenetus the seer and received his wealth not by kinship but because of his virtue, so that he would surely not grudge it if someone, having shown himself useful to his children, [should obtain] the same gift of which he himself was deemed worthy. And you must also remember what was said at the beginning.

​For I demonstrated to you that he valued our connection so highly that he married both my father’s sister and my cousin. And yet, to whom would he have more readily given his own daughter than to those from whom he himself chose to receive wives? And from what house would he have more gladly seen a son adopted for himself according to the laws than from this one, from which he also sought to have children born to him by nature?

​So if you vote the estate to me, your decision will be honorable both toward him and toward all others who have any concern in these matters; but if, persuaded by this woman, you are deceived, you will wrong not only me, but also Thrasylochus who left the will, and Sopolis, and their sister, who is now living with me as my wife, and their mother, who would be the most miserable of all women, if it should not suffice for her to be deprived of her children, but if this should also be added to her lot, so as to see their will made invalid and the house left desolate, ​and [to see] this woman, who rejoiced in her family’s misfortunes, claiming the property, while I, who acted in such a way toward her family, am unable to obtain any justice. So that if anyone should compare me, not with this woman, but with all those who have ever disputed a claim under a will, I would be found to have been second to none of them in my conduct toward my friends. And yet you ought to honor such men and value them highly, rather than deprive them of the gifts given by others.

​And it is also right to support the law according to which we are permitted both to adopt children and to dispose of our own property, reflecting that for those who are childless among men, this law stands in the place of children; for because of this, both relatives and those who are not related at all take better care of one another.

​But that I may bring my speech to an end and no longer consume time, consider what powerful and just arguments I bring before you. First, a friendship with those who left the estate that is ancient, hereditary, and unbroken through all time; next, many and great services rendered to them when they were in misfortune; and in addition to these, a will acknowledged by my opponents themselves; and finally, a law supporting this, which is held by all Greeks to be excellently enacted.

​And here is the greatest proof of this: for though they differ on many other matters, they hold the same opinion on this. I entreat you, therefore, remembering both these and the other things that have been said, to render a just verdict, and to prove yourselves such judges to me as you would wish to obtain for yourselves.