Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​And justice is [...]. And magnanimity is the knowledge or disposition that makes one superior to the things that happen in common to both base and good men; continence is a state that does not transgress what is in accordance with right reason, or a disposition undefeated by pleasures; endurance is a knowledge or disposition of what things are to be steadfastly held to, what not, and what are neither; quick-wittedness is a disposition inventive of the appropriate action on the spur of the moment; and good counsel is the knowledge of examining what things and in what manner we shall act to our advantage. And proportionally, among the vices also, some are primary and others are subordinate to these: such as foolishness, cowardice, injustice, and intemperance among the primary; while incontinence, dullness, and ill-counseledness are among those subordinate to these. And the vices are states of ignorance of the very things of which the virtues are states of knowledge.

​And good is broadly that from which there is some benefit, but specifically it is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Hence both virtue itself and that which partakes of it are said to be good in three ways: namely, the good from which it happens that 〈benefit arises; that in accordance with which it happens〉, as the action in accordance with virtue; and that by which it happens, as the good man who partakes of virtue. And in another way they define the good specifically as follows: “that which is perfect according to nature for a rational being as rational.” And virtue is of such a kind; so that what partakes of it are the actions in accordance with virtue and the good men; while the supervenient products are joy, gladness, and things similar.

​And likewise among vices, one kind is foolishness, cowardice, injustice, and similar things; that which partakes of vice is the actions in accordance with vice and the base men; while the supervenient products are despondency, gloom, and similar things. Furthermore, of goods, some are pertaining to the soul, some are external, and some are neither pertaining to the soul nor external. Those pertaining to the soul are the virtues and the actions in accordance with them; external goods are having an excellent fatherland, an excellent friend, and their happiness; and those neither external nor pertaining to the soul are that a person himself is excellent and happy to himself.

​And conversely, among evils, some are pertaining to the soul, namely the vices and the actions in accordance with them; external evils are having a foolish fatherland and a foolish friend, and their unhappiness; and those neither external nor pertaining to the soul are that a person himself is base and unhappy to himself. Furthermore, of goods, some are final, some are productive, and some are both final and productive. A friend, then, and the benefits arising from him are productive goods; while confidence, high-mindedness, freedom, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every action in accordance with virtue are final.

​And productive and final goods are 〈the virtues〉. For insofar as they accomplish happiness, they are productive goods; but insofar as they fully constitute it so as to become parts of it, they are final. And likewise of evils, some are final, some are productive, and some have both characters. An enemy and the harms arising from him are productive; while panic, meanness of spirit, slavery, unpleasantness, despondency, excessive grief, and every action in accordance with vice are final; and those having both characters are 〈the vices〉, since insofar as they produce unhappiness they are productive, but insofar as they fully constitute it so as to become parts of it, they are final.