- Source
- Diogenes Laertius. Hicks, R. D., editor. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.8-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:7.1.40-7.1.44
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-09-28
The passage outlines the metaphors and order of the tripartite division of philosophy (logic, ethics, physics) in Stoicism, and details the definitions and divisions of rhetoric and dialectic, especially dialectic's branches of meaning (lekta) and voice, along with various logical paradoxes.
εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῴῳ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὀστοῖς μὲν καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικὸν προσομοιοῦντες, τοῖς δὲ σαρκωδεστέροις τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ πάλιν ᾠῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὸ λογικόν1, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἠθικόν, τὰ δʼ ἐσωτάτω τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ ἀγρῷ παμφόρῳ· οὗ τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμὸν τὸ λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἢ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν. ἢ πόλει καλῶς τετειχισμένῃ καὶ κατὰ λόγον διοικουμένῃ. Καὶ οὐθὲν μέρος τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καθά τινες αὐτῶν φασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι αὐτά. καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν μικτὴν ἐποίουν. ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λογικὸν τάττουσι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικόν, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἠθικόν· ὧν ἐστι Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ Εὔδρομος.
They compare philosophy to a living creature, likening the logical part to bones and sinews, the ethical to the fleshiest parts, and the physical to the soul. Or again to an egg: for the outer parts are logic, the parts after these ethics, and the innermost parts physics. Or to a fertile orchard: where the surrounding hedge is logic, the fruit ethics, and the earth or the trees physics. Or to a city well-walled and governed according to reason. And no part is separated from the other, as some of them say, but they are mixed together; and they used to make the transmission of them mixed. But others arrange logic first, physics second, and ethics third; among whom are Zeno in On Reason, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Eudromus.
Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πτολεμαεὺς Διογένης ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἄρχεται, ὁ δʼ Ἀπολλόδωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά2, Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχονται, καθά φησι Φανίας ὁ Ποσειδωνίου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ποσειδωνείων σχολῶν. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἓξ μέρη φησί, διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν. ἄλλοι δʼ οὐ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα μέρη φασίν, ἀλλʼ αὐτῆς τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ Ταρσεύς. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν. τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι.
For Diogenes of Ptolemais begins with ethics, while Apollodorus places ethics second, and Panaetius and Posidonius begin with physics, as Phanias, the acquaintance of Posidonius, states in the first book of Posidonian Lectures. But Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology. Others say that these are not parts of discourse, but of philosophy itself, as Zeno of Tarsus does. Some say that the logical part is divided into two sciences, into rhetoric and into dialectic; and some also into the definitional species, which concerns canons and criteria; but some remove the definitional part altogether.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνουσι. καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν3 τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων· ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ῥητορικὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τριμερῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι συμβουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ δικανικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμιαστικόν.
Now, they take up the study of canons and criteria for the sake of discovering the truth; for in it they rectify the differences among impressions. And similarly, they take up the definitional part for the recognition of truth; for through concepts things are grasped. They also hold rhetoric to be the science of speaking well concerning discourses in continuous exposition, and dialectic that of conversing correctly concerning discourses in question and answer; whence they also define it thus, as the science of things true, false, and neither. And they say that rhetoric itself is tripartite; for one part of it is deliberative, another forensic, and another epideictic.
Εἶναι δʼ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν λόγον εἴς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον. Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων4 καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων·
And its division is into invention, style, arrangement, and delivery; and the rhetorical speech is divided into the prologue, the narrative, the arguments against opponents, and the epilogue. Dialectic is divided into the topic concerning things signified and that of the voice; and that of things signified is divided into the topic concerning impressions and the sayables (lekta) subsisting from them—propositions, complete expressions, predicates, and the like active and passive forms, as well as genera and species—and similarly into arguments, modes, syllogisms, and sophisms arising from voice and from things;
ὧν εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους5 καὶ ἀληθεύοντας καὶ ἀποφάσκοντας σωρίτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἐλλιπεῖς καὶ ἀπόρους καὶ περαίνοντας καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένους κερατίνας τε καὶ οὔτιδας καὶ θερίζοντας. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων.
among which are "the Liar" arguments, truth-telling ones, denying ones, sorites and those similar to these, defective ones, unresolvable ones, conclusive ones, "the Veiled", "the Horned", "the Nobody", and "the Reaper". And dialectic also has as a proper topic the aforementioned one concerning the voice itself, in which is shown what articulate voice is, and what the parts of speech are, and concerning solecism, barbarism, poems, ambiguities, melodious voice, music, and, according to some, definitions, divisions, and diction.
- 7.1.40τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὸ λογικόν
Accusative and infinitive construction in indirect speech dependent on the implied verb of saying/comparing (εἰκάζουσι or φασί); τὰ ἐκτός functions as the accusative subject and τὸ λογικόν as the predicate accusative.
- 7.1.41ὁ δʼ Ἀπολλόδωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά
Ellipsis of the verb. A transitive verb corresponding to τάττει or τίθησι ('places ethics second') is understood from the context; τὰ ἠθικά is the direct object and δεύτερα functions as a predicate accusative.
- 7.1.42τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν... καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν
Accusative with participle construction in indirect discourse continuing the Stoic doctrines (dependent on the general sense of λέγουσι); τήν τε ῥητορικήν and τὴν διαλεκτικήν are the subjects, and ἐπιστήμην is the predicate accusative with οὖσαν (which is also understood with τὴν διαλεκτικήν).
- 7.1.43τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων
A series of genitives specifying lekta (sayables). ἀξιωμάτων (propositions), αὐτοτελῶν (complete lekta), and κατηγορημάτων (predicates) stand in apposition to or as species coordinate with τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν.
- 7.1.44ὧν εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους
A relative clause continuing the indirect speech. The antecedent of the relative genitive ὧν is the preceding σοφισμάτων (or λόγων). The accusatives starting with ψευδομένους λόγους serve as subjects (or predicate accusatives) governed by the infinitive εἶναι.
