Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​And they held that to the foolish person living is profitable, but to the prudent person it is indifferent. And the wise man will do all things for his own sake; for he considers no one else equally worthy as himself. For even if he appears to reap the greatest advantages from someone, they are not of equal worth to what he himself provides. They also rejected the senses on the ground that they do not make cognition precise, and held that one should do all things according to what appears reasonable. They said that errors merit pardon; for a person does not err voluntarily, but is compelled by some affection. And he will not hate, but rather teach anew. The wise man will not exert himself so much in the choice of good things as in the avoidance of evils, making his end to live neither painfully nor sorrowfully;

​which indeed accrues to those who have become indifferent toward the things productive of pleasure. The Annicereans in other respects held the same views as these, but they also admitted into life friendship, gratitude, honoring of parents, and acting to some extent on behalf of one's fatherland. Whence, on account of these things, even if the wise man undertakes annoyances, he will be none the less happy, even if few pleasant things accrue to him. And the happiness of a friend is not desirable for its own sake; for it is not perceptible to one's neighbor. Nor is reasoned argument sufficient for having confidence and rising above the opinion of the multitude; but it is necessary to be reconditioned (de-habituated) on account of the bad disposition nurtured together with us from of old.

​And one should accept a friend not merely on account of utilities, so as not to heed him if these run short, but also on account of the goodwill that has come into being, for the sake of which one will also endure toils. Even though he posits pleasure as the end and is distressed at being deprived of it, nevertheless he willingly endures for the sake of affection toward his friend. Those called Theodoreans drew their name from the aforementioned Theodorus, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was one who thoroughly abolished beliefs concerning the gods; and we have come across a book of his entitled On the Gods, which is not contemptible; and from this they say Epicurus took most of what he stated.

​Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes says in the Successions of Philosophers. He took joy and grief to be the end: the former based on prudence, the latter on folly; and as goods he took prudence and justice, as evils their contrary dispositions, and as intermediates pleasure and pain. He also rejected friendship, because it exists neither among fools nor among the wise. For in the case of the former, when utility is removed, friendship also departs; while the wise, being self-sufficient, do not need friends. He used to say too that it is reasonable for the virtuous man not to take his own life on behalf of his fatherland; for he should not throw away his prudence for the sake of the benefit of fools.

​And he held that the cosmos is one's fatherland. He will also steal, commit adultery, and rob temples in due season; for none of these things is disgraceful by nature, if the opinion concerning them is removed, which was put together for the sake of holding together the foolish. And the wise man will openly associate with the objects of his love without any suspicion. Wherefore he also used to ask arguments such as this: “Would a woman skilled in letters be useful insofar as she is skilled in letters?” “Yes.” “And would a boy and a youth skilled in letters be useful insofar as he is skilled in letters?” “Yes.” “Is not, then, also a beautiful woman useful insofar as she is beautiful, and a beautiful boy and youth useful insofar as he is beautiful?” “Yes.” “Then a beautiful boy and youth too would be useful for that purpose for which he is beautiful?” “Yes.”