Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

"Indeed, nor does the moving body itself arrive at several places at the same time in periods discernible by reason—for that is inconceivable;—and if this body arrives together in perceptible time from wherever in the infinite, it will not be departing from the place from which we comprehend its motion; for it will be like a case of resistance, even if we grant the speed of its motion to be unresisted up to that point. It is useful indeed to grasp this principle as well. Next, that the images possess unsurpassable thinness is not contradicted by any of the phenomena; whence they also have unsurpassable speeds, having every passage commensurate with the fact that, in contrast with the infinity of atoms, nothing or few things resist them, whereas many and infinite atoms immediately meet with some resistance.

"In addition to these points, the generation of the images happens as quick as thought. For there is a continuous flow from the surface of bodies, not noticeable by decrease because of the mutual replenishment, preserving for a long time the position and arrangement of the atoms upon the solid body, even if it is sometimes confused; and rapid compoundings occur in the surrounding space because the filling up need not occur in depth; and there are certain other ways capable of generating natures of this kind. For none of these things is contradicted by the senses, if one observes in what manner to relate clear evidential perceptions so as to trace back the sympatheias from external things to ourselves.

"One must also believe that we see and think when something enters from the outside; for external things could not imprint their own nature of both color and form through the air between us and them, nor through rays or whatever effluences proceed from us to them, so well as when certain outlines enter us from the objects, having the same color and the same shape in a size suitable for sight or thought, employing swift motions,

​and then for this reason presenting the impression of a single and continuous thing, and preserving the sympatheia from the underlying object in accordance with the proportionate impact from there resulting from the vibration of the atoms in depth within the solid body. And whatever impression we receive apprehendingly by the intellect or by the sense organs, whether of shape or of accidental properties, this is the shape of the solid body, coming to be in accordance with the sequential condensation or residue of the image; but falsehood and error always consist in the added opinion 〈regarding that which awaits〉 confirmation or non-refutation, when it is then not confirmed 〈or is refuted〉 [in accordance with a certain movement in ourselves joined with the imaginative apprehension, but having a distinct judgment, according to which falsehood comes to be].

"For the likeness of impressions, whether taken as it were in a portrait, or occurring in sleep, or in other apprehensions of the intellect or of the other criteria, would never have belonged to things that exist and are called true, if there were not certain things of such a kind to which we compare them; but error would not have existed, if we did not also receive a certain other motion in ourselves, joined to the imaginative apprehension, but admitting a distinct judgment; and in accordance with this motion, if it is not confirmed or is refuted, falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not refuted, truth arises.

"One must therefore firmly maintain this opinion, so that the criteria based on clear evidential perceptions may not be destroyed, nor error, being similarly affirmed, throw all things into confusion. Furthermore, hearing also occurs by means of a stream carried from that which utters voice or makes a sound or noise or in any way whatsoever produces an auditory affection. And this stream is dispersed into particles of like parts, at the same time preserving a certain mutual sympatheia and a peculiar unity extending back to the sending body, and for the most part producing the perceptual awareness of that object, or if not, at least rendering clear that it comes from outside."