Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

[XXIX.] Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but come about through empty opinion. [Epicurus considers those that free from pain to be natural and necessary, such as drink in thirst; natural but not necessary, those that merely vary pleasure but do not remove the pain, such as luxurious food; and neither natural nor necessary, such as crowns and the erection of statues.] [XXX.] Among natural desires, in those which do not lead to pain if they are not fulfilled, yet intense zeal is present, these arise through empty opinion, and it is not through their own nature that they are not dispersed, but through the groundless opinion of man.

[XXXI.] The justice of nature is a pledge of utility, directed toward not harming one another nor being harmed. [XXXII.] As many animals as were not able to make agreements not to harm others nor be harmed, toward these there was nothing just or unjust. And likewise also for as many nations as were not able or not willing to make agreements not to harm nor be harmed. [XXXIII.] Justice was not something in itself, but in mutual associations, in whatever localities at all, a certain agreement not to harm nor be harmed.

[XXXIV.] Injustice is not an evil in itself, but in the fear arising from suspicion that one will not escape those appointed as punishers of such things. [XXXV.] It is not possible for someone who secretly violates any of the things agreed upon with one another for not harming nor being harmed, to believe that he will escape, even if he escapes detection ten thousand times at present. For until the end of life, it is uncertain whether he will indeed escape. [XXXVI.] According to the common view, justice is the same for all, for it was something useful in mutual association; but according to the particular character of a country and whatever causes there may be, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.

[XXXVII.] That which among the things deemed just is attested to be useful in the requirements of mutual association possesses the character of justice, whether it turns out to be the same for all or not the same. But if someone lays down a law, and it does not turn out in accordance with the utility of mutual association, this no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in accordance with justice shifts, yet for a certain time harmonizes with the preconception, it was none the less just for that time for those who do not disturb themselves with empty words, but look simply to the facts.

[XXXVIII.] Where, without circumstances having changed, the things deemed just appeared in actual practice not to harmonize with the preconception, these were not just. But where, with circumstances having changed, the same established just laws were no longer useful, there they were just at the time when they were useful for the mutual association of fellow citizens; but later they were no longer just, when they were not useful.

[XXXIX.] He who has best organized against the lack of confidence arising from external things, made what was possible of the same kind; and what was not possible, at least not of an alien kind; and regarding all those matters where he was not able to do even this, he refrained from mixing, and excluded as many of them as it was profitable so to do. [XL.] Those who had the power to procure confidence especially from their neighbors lived with one another most pleasantly in this way, possessing the firmest pledge, and having received the fullest intimacy, they did not lament the premature end of the deceased as an object for pity.