← Augustine

On Faith and the Creed

§17

Material Analogies for the Doctrine of the Trinity

The author introduces material analogies—such as the relationship of 'fountain, river, and drink' to water, and 'root, trunk, and branches' to wood—to demonstrate how three distinct entities can share a single, singular name, thereby showing that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is not absurd.

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§17

​Nec mirum, quod haec de ineffabili natura dicuntur, cum in his etiam rebus, quas corporeis oculis cernimus et corporeo sensu diiudicamus, tale aliquid accidat. nam cum de fonte interrogati non possumus dicere, quod ipse sit1 fluuius, nec de fluuio interrogati possumus eum fontem uocare, rursus potionem, quae de fonte uel fluuio est, nec fluuium possumus appellare nec fontem, tamen in hac trinitate2 aquam nominamus et cum de singulis quaeritur, singillatim aquam respondemus. nam si quaero, utrum in fonte aqua sit, respondetur aqua; et si quaeram, utrum aqua sit in fluuio, nihil aliud respondetur, et in illa potione non poterit alia esse responsio; nec tamen eas tres aquas, sed unam dicimus. sane cauendum est, ne quisquam ineffabilem illius maiestatis substantiam sicut fontem istum uisibilem atque corporeum uel fluuium uel potionem cogitet. in his enim aqua illa, quae nunc in fonte est, exit in fluuium nec in se manet; et cum de fluuio uel de fonte in potionem transit, non ibi permanet, unde sumitur. itaque fieri potest, ut eadem aqua nunc ad fontis appellationem pertineat, nunc ad fluuii, nunc ad potionis, cum in illa trinitate dixerimus non posse fieri, ut pater ipse aliquando sit filius, aliquando spiritus sanctus. sicut in arbore radix non est nisi radix nec robur est aliud quam robur nec ramos nisi ramos possumus dicere; non enim quod dicitur radix, potest dici et robur et rami; nec lignum, quod pertinet ad radicem, potest aliquo transitu nunc in radice esse, nunc in robore, nunc in ramis, sed tantummodo in radice, cum illa regula nominis maneat, ut radix lignum sit et robur lignum et rami lignum, nec tamen tria3 ligna dicantur, sed unum. aut si haec habent aliquam dissimilitudinem, ut possint non absurde tria ligna nominari, ut etiam tria ligna dici possunt propter firmitatis diuersitatem, illud certe omnes concedunt, si ex uno fonte tria pocula inpleantur, posse dici tria pocula, tres autem aquas non posse dici, sed omnino unam aquam, quamquam de singulis poculis interrogatus in quolibet horum aquam esse respondeas, quamuis nullus hic transitus fiat, sicut de fonte in fluuium dicebamus. sed haec non propter illius diuinae naturae similitudinem, sed propter uisibilium etiam unitatem corporalia exempla data sunt, ut intellegeretur fieri posse, ut aliqua tria non tantum singillatim, sed etiam simul singulare nomen obtineant, ne quisquam miretur et absurdum putet, quod deum dicimus patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum nec tamen tres deos in ista trinitate, sed unum unamque substantiam.

​Nor is it a wonder that these things are said concerning the ineffable nature, since even in these things which we discern with bodily eyes and judge with bodily sense, something of the sort happens. For when questioned concerning a fountain, we cannot say that it is itself the river; nor when questioned concerning the river, can we call it the fountain; again, the drink which is from the fountain or the river, we can call neither the river nor the fountain; yet in this trinity we name the water, and when we are questioned concerning each, we answer individually “water.” For if I ask whether there is water in the fountain, “water” is answered; and if I ask whether there is water in the river, nothing else is answered, and in that drink there cannot be any other answer; yet we do not call them three waters, but one. Certainly, we must take care lest anyone think of the ineffable substance of that majesty as this visible and bodily fountain, or river, or drink. For in these things, that water which is now in the fountain goes out into the river and does not remain in itself; and when it passes from the river or from the fountain into the drink, it does not remain there from whence it is taken. And so it can happen that the same water now belongs to the name of the fountain, now to that of the river, now to that of the drink, whereas in that Trinity we have said that it cannot happen that the Father Himself is at one time the Son, and at another time the Holy Spirit. Just as in a tree, the root is nothing but the root, nor is the trunk anything else than the trunk, nor can we call the branches anything but branches; for that which is called the root cannot be called both trunk and branches; nor can the wood which belongs to the root, by any transition, be now in the root, now in the trunk, now in the branches, but only in the root, although that rule of the name remains, that the root is wood, and the trunk is wood, and the branches are wood, yet they are not called three woods, but one. Or if these have some dissimilarity, so that they can without absurdity be named three woods, as indeed they can be called three woods on account of the difference in solidity, yet everyone certainly concedes this: if from one fountain three cups are filled, they can be called three cups, but three waters cannot be called, but altogether one water, although questioned concerning each cup you would answer that there is water in any of them, even though no transition takes place here, as we were saying concerning the fountain into the river. But these bodily examples were given, not on account of the likeness of that divine nature, but on account of the unity even of visible things, so that it might be understood to be possible that some three things obtain a singular name not only individually but also together; lest anyone should wonder and think it absurd that we call God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, and yet not three gods in that Trinity, but one God and one substance.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 17cum illa regula nominis maneat, ut radix lignum sit...

    The cum clause with the subjunctive present maneat expresses a concessive or adversative relation ('although' or 'while'). This is followed by the ut clause (ut radix lignum sit...), which is a noun clause in apposition explaining the specific content of illa regula (explanatory ut-clause).

  2. 17in hac trinitate

    Prior to referencing the divine Trinity, the author uses the word trinitas to refer to the threefold combination of 'fountain, river, and drink'. This reflects Augustine's characteristic analogical method of finding vestiges of the divine Trinity (vestigia Trinitatis) within the visible creation.

  3. 17ut intellegeretur fieri posse, ut aliqua tria...

    Within the purpose clause ut intellegeretur (so that it might be understood), which depends on the main verb data sunt (were given), the impersonal infinitive phrase fieri posse (to be possible) acts as the subject, which in turn takes a substantive ut clause (ut ... obtineant) explaining what is possible. It is a grammatically dense structure with nested ut clauses.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa006.humanitext-lat1:17