- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:6.1.1.pr-6.1.1.3
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-12
Following the actions for entireties, the action for the recovery of individual things (real action) is introduced, outlining its scope (movables, immovables), its limited application to free persons under paternal power, and its application to collective assets like flocks.
[ULPIANUS libro sexto decimo ad edictum.]
[ULPIANUS, in the sixteenth book on the Edict.]
Post actiones, quae de uniuersitate propositae sunt, subicitur actio singularum rerum petitionis.
After the actions which are proposed concerning an entirety, there follows the action for the recovery of individual things.
Quae specialis in rem actio1 locum habet in omnibus rebus mobilibus, tam animalibus quam his quae anima carent, et in his quae solo continentur.
This special real action has place in all movable things, both living animals and those which lack life, and in those things which are contained in the soil.
Per hanc autem actionem liberae personae, quae sunt iuris nostri, ut puta liberi qui sunt in potestate, non petuntur: petuntur igitur aut praeiudiciis aut interdictis aut cognitione praetoria, et ita Pomponius libro trigensimo septimo: nisi forte, inquit, adiecta causa2 quis uindicet: si quis ita petit 'filium suum' uel 'in potestate ex iure Romano', uidetur mihi et Pomponius consentire recte eum egisse:3 ait enim adiecta causa ex lege Quiritium uindicare posse.
By this action, however, free persons who are under our power, as for instance children who are in power, are not claimed. Therefore, they are claimed either by preliminary actions, or by interdicts, or by praetorian cognitive procedure; and so Pomponius writes in his thirty-seventh book: unless perhaps, he says, someone claims them by adding a cause: if someone thus claims “his own son” or “in his power by Roman law”, it seems to me that Pomponius also agrees that he has sued correctly; for he says that one can claim them under Quiritian law by adding a cause.
Per hanc autem actionem non solum singulae res uindicabuntur, sed posse etiam gregem uindicari Pomponius libro lectionum uicensimo quinto scribit. idem et de armento et de equitio ceterisque, quae gregatim habentur, dicendum est. sed enim gregem sufficit ipsum nostrum esse, licet singula capita nostra non sint:4 grex enim, non singula corpora uindicabuntur.
By this action, moreover, not only individual things will be claimed, but Pomponius writes in his twenty-fifth book of Readings that a flock can also be claimed. The same must be said of a herd of cattle, a herd of horses, and other things which are kept in flocks. For indeed, it is sufficient that the flock itself is ours, even though the individual heads are not ours; for it is the flock, and not the individual bodies, that will be claimed.
- 6.1.1.1Quae specialis in rem actio
Usage of the relative connection. The relative pronoun Quae at the beginning of the sentence functions as a relative adjective referring back to the actio singularum rerum petitionis in the preceding section.
- 6.1.1.2adiecta causa
Ablative absolute, meaning "with a cause added." It refers to explicitly adding the legal ground or origin of paternal power in the pleadings, rather than bringing a simple real action.
- 6.1.1.2uidetur mihi et Pomponius consentire recte eum egisse
The impersonal construction uidetur mihi ("it seems to me") governs the nominative with infinitive Pomponius consentire ("that Pomponius also agrees"), which in turn governs the accusative with infinitive recte eum egisse ("that he has sued correctly"). The word et here functions adverbially as "also."
- 6.1.1.3licet singula capita nostra non sint
The conjunction licet ("although / even if") takes the present subjunctive sint to form a concessive clause, indicating that for the real action regarding a collective entity (a flock), it is not necessary for every individual animal to belong to the plaintiff.