- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:4.8.32.pr-4.8.32.10
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-10
This chunk coordinates rules regarding penalties, grounds for the dissolution of arbitration agreements, and exceptional situations where an arbitrator cannot be compelled to render a decision, such as the assumption of a priesthood or embassy, and status disputes.
[PAULUS libro tertio decimo ad edictum.]
[PAULUS in his thirteenth book on the Edict.]
Non distinguemus in compromissis, minor an maior sit poena quam res de qua agitur.
We shall make no distinction in arbitration agreements as to whether the penalty is less or greater than the value of the matter in dispute.
Non cogetur arbiter sententiam dicere, si poena commissa sit.
An arbitrator will not be compelled to render a decision if the penalty has already been incurred.
Si mulier alieno nomine compromittat, non erit pecunia compromissa propter intercessionem.
If a woman enters into an arbitration agreement on behalf of another, the money agreed upon will not be due, because of the prohibition against intercession.
Summa rei est, ut praetor se non interponat, siue initio nullum sit compromissum: siue sit, sed pendeat an ex eo poena exigi potest: siue postea deficiat1 poena compromisso soluto die morte acceptilatione iudicio pacto.2
The sum of the matter is that the praetor will not intervene, whether there was no arbitration agreement from the beginning, or there was one but it remains pending whether the penalty can be exacted from it, or afterwards the penalty fails because the arbitration agreement is extinguished by the expiration of the day, by death, by release, by judgment, or by agreement.
Sacerdotio obueniente uidebimus an cogatur arbiter sententiam dicere: id enim non tantum honori personarum, sed et maiestati dei indulgetur, cuius sacris uacare sacerdotes oportet. ceterum si postea suscepit, iste quoque omnimodo sententiam ferre debet.
If a priesthood should fall to an arbitrator, we shall see whether he is compelled to render a decision; for this indulgence is granted not only out of respect for the persons, but also for the majesty of God, whose sacred rites the priests must attend to. However, if he accepted the office of arbitrator after obtaining the priesthood, he too must by all means render a decision.
Item non est cogendus, si de negotio transactum est, uel homo mortuus est de quo erat compromissum: nisi si posteriore casu aliquid litigantium intersit.
Likewise, he is not to be compelled if a compromise has been reached concerning the business, or if the slave concerning whom the arbitration was made has died; unless, in the latter case, the litigants have some interest in the matter.
Iulianus indistincte scribit: si per errorem de famoso delicto ad arbitrum itum est, uel de ea re, de qua publicum iudicium sit constitutum, ueluti de adulteriis sicariis et similibus, uetare debet praetor sententiam dicere nec dare dictae exsecutionem.
Julian writes without distinction: if by error resort was had to an arbitrator concerning an infamous delict, or concerning a matter for which a public trial has been established, such as adultery, assassination, and the like, the praetor ought to forbid the rendering of a decision and must not grant execution of a decision that has been rendered.
De liberali causa compromisso facto recte non compelletur arbiter sententiam dicere, quia fauor libertatis est, ut maiores iudices habere debeat. eadem dicenda sunt, siue de ingenuitate siue de libertinitate quaestio sit et si ex fideicommissi causa libertas deberi dicatur. idem dicendum est in populari actione.
When an arbitration agreement is made concerning a status of freedom, the arbitrator is rightly not compelled to render a decision, because there is a favor shown to freedom, which requires that it should have superior judges. The same must be said whether the question is about free birth or about freed status, and also if freedom is said to be due under a fideicommissum. The same must be said in a popular action.
Si seruus compromiserit, non cogendum dicere sententiam arbitrum, nec si dixerit, poenae exsecutionem dandam de peculio putat Octauenus. sed an, si liber cum eo compromiserit, exsecutio aduersus liberum detur, uideamus: sed magis est, ut non detur.
If a slave enters into an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator is not to be compelled to render a decision; and even if he does, Octavenus thinks that execution of the penalty should not be granted against the peculium. But let us see whether, if a free person enters into an arbitration agreement with him, execution should be granted against the free person; it is more correct, however, that it should not be granted.
Item si quis Romae compromiserit, mox Romam in legationem uenerit: non est cogendus arbiter sententiam dicere, non magis quam cogeretur, si litem ante contestatus esset, nunc eam exercere:3 nec interest, tunc quoque in legatione fuerit an non. sed si nunc in legatione compromittat, puto cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia et si iudicium sponte accepisset, cogeretur peragere. sunt tamen qui de isto non recte dubitant: qui utique nullo modo dubitabunt, si de ea re in legatione compromisit, quam in legatione contraxit: quia et iudicium eo nomine accipere cogeretur. illud in prima specie potest dispici, an, si ante compromisit legatus, cogendus sit arbiter sententiam dicere, si ipse legatus postulet: quod prima ratione poterit uideri iniquum, ut in ipsius potestate sit. sed hoc tale erit, quale si actionem uelit dictare, quod facere ei licet. sed compromissum istud comparabimus ordinariae actioni, ut non alias audiatur desiderans ut arbiter sententiam dicat, quam si se defendat.4
Likewise, if anyone entered into an arbitration agreement at Rome, and shortly afterward came to Rome on an embassy, the arbitrator is not to be compelled to render a decision, any more than he would be compelled to proceed with a lawsuit if he had joined issue before, but now had to carry it on; and it makes no difference whether he was also on an embassy at that time or not. But if he enters into an arbitration agreement now while on an embassy, I think the arbitrator must be compelled to render a decision, because even if he had voluntarily accepted a trial, he would be compelled to complete it. There are, however, some who doubt this, and not rightly; who, at any rate, will have no doubt if he entered into an arbitration agreement while on an embassy concerning a matter which he contracted while on an embassy, because he would also be compelled to accept a trial on that account. In the first class of cases, it may be examined whether, if the envoy had entered into the arbitration agreement beforehand, the arbitrator should be compelled to render a decision if the envoy himself demands it. This might at first sight seem unfair, as being in his own power. But this is just as if he wished to bring an action, which he is permitted to do. Yet we shall compare this arbitration agreement to an ordinary action, so that he who desires the arbitrator to render a decision shall not be heard otherwise than if he defends himself.
Si is faciat controuersiam hereditatis, qui cum defuncto compromiserat, futurum est praeiudicium hereditati, si arbiter sententiam dicat: ergo interea inhibendus est arbiter.
If one who had entered into an arbitration agreement with the deceased raises a dispute concerning the inheritance, a decision by the arbitrator would create a prejudice to the inheritance; therefore, in the meantime, the arbitrator must be restrained.
- 4.8.32.3siue postea deficiat
The conjunction siue, parallel to the preceding siue initio... and siue sit..., introduces the third alternative ("or if").
- 4.8.32.3compromisso soluto die morte acceptilatione iudicio pacto
"compromisso soluto" can be understood as an ablative absolute ("the arbitration agreement being dissolved") or as an ablative of cause. The subsequent nouns "die", "morte", "acceptilatione", "iudicio", "pacto" are all ablatives of means or cause, specifying the concrete ways (expiration of the day, death, formal release, judgment, pact) by which the arbitration agreement is dissolved.
- 4.8.32.9non magis quam cogeretur, si litem ante contestatus esset, nunc eam exercere
In the comparative construction "non magis quam..." ("no more than..."), "cogeretur" (subjunctive imperfect) represents a counterfactual result in the present. The condition "si litem ante contestatus esset" ("if he had joined issue beforehand") is a past counterfactual condition, which conditions the present counterfactual infinitive phrase "nunc eam exercere [cogeretur]" ("now to carry it on [he would be compelled]", with "cogeretur" understood).
- 4.8.32.9ut non alias audiatur desiderans ut arbiter sententiam dicat, quam si se defendat
A restrictive construction using "non alias... quam si..." ("not otherwise than if..."). "audiatur" (present subjunctive) means "is heard" or "is allowed". "desiderans" is a participle acting as the subject ("one who desires"), which takes the noun clause "ut arbiter sententiam dicat" ("that the arbitrator render a decision"). The entire phrase sets a strict condition: his demand for a decision is only accepted if he himself submits to defense.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-07-12) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1