- Source
- Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Mommsen, Theodor & Krueger, Paul, editors. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:4.3.7.pr-4.3.7.10
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Ulpian details the supplementary nature of the action for fraud, which is granted only when no other action is available, discussing its requirements and exceptions across various specific legal relations with reference to the opinions of Pomponius and Labeo.
[ULPIANUS libro undecimo ad edictum.]
[ULPIANUS libro undecimo ad edictum.]
Et eleganter Pomponius haec uerba 'si alia actio non sit1' sic excipit, quasi res alio modo ei ad quem ea res pertinet salua esse non poterit. nec uidetur huic sententiae aduersari, quod Iulianus libro quarto scribit,2 si minor annis uiginti quinque consilio serui circumscriptus eum uendidit cum peculio emptorque eum manumisit, dandam in manumissum de dolo actionem (hoc enim sic accipimus carere dolo emptorem, ut ex empto teneri non possit) aut nullam esse uenditionem, si in hoc ipso ut uenderet circumscriptus est. et quod minor proponitur, non inducit in integrum restitutionem: nam aduersus manumissum nulla in integrum restitutio potest locum habere.
And Pomponius elegantly interprets these words ‘if there should be no other action’ in such a way, as if the matter cannot be saved in any other way for him to whom that matter belongs. Nor does it seem to oppose this opinion, what Julian writes in his fourth book, that if a minor under twenty-five years of age, deceived by the advice of a slave, sold him with his peculium, and the buyer manumitted him, the action for fraud is to be granted against the manumitted person (for we understand this to mean that the buyer is free from fraud, so that he cannot be held liable under the action on purchase), or that the sale is null, if he was deceived in the very matter of selling. And the fact that he is proposed as a minor does not bring about a restitution to the original state; for against a manumitted person no restitution to the original state can take place.
Secundum quae et si poenali actione indemnitati eius consuli possit, dicendum erit cessare de dolo actionem.
According to which, even if his indemnity can be provided for by a penal action, it must be said that the action for fraud ceases.
Pomponius autem, etiam si popularis actio sit, cessare de dolo ait actionem.
Pomponius, however, says that even if there is a popular action, the action for fraud ceases.
Non solum autem si alia actio non sit, sed et si dubitetur an alia sit, putat Labeo de dolo dandam actionem et adfert talem speciem. qui seruum mihi debebat uel ex uenditione uel ex stipulatu, uenenum ei dedit et sic eum tradidit: uel fundum, et dum tradit, imposuit ei seruitutem uel aedificia diruit, arbores excidit uel extirpauit: ait Labeo, siue cauit de dolo siue non, dandam in eum de dolo actionem, quoniam si cauit, dubium est an competat ex stipulatu actio. sed est uerius, si quidem de dolo cautum est, cessare actionem de dolo, quoniam est ex stipulatu actio: si non est cautum, in ex empto quidem actione cessat de dolo actio, quoniam est ex empto, in ex stipulatu de dolo actio necessaria est.
Moreover, Labeo thinks that the action for fraud should be granted not only if there is no other action, but also if it is doubtful whether there is another, and he brings forward such a case. A person who owed me a slave either from a sale or from a stipulation, gave him poison and thus delivered him; or a tract of land, and while delivering it, imposed a servitude upon it or demolished buildings, cut down or uprooted trees. Labeo says that, whether he gave security against fraud or not, the action for fraud is to be granted against him, since if he did give security, it is doubtful whether the action on the stipulation is competent. But it is more correct that, if indeed security against fraud has been given, the action for fraud ceases, since there is an action on the stipulation; if security has not been given, in the case of the action on purchase indeed, the action for fraud ceases because there is an action on purchase, but in the case of the action on a stipulation, the action for fraud is necessary.
Si seruum usuarium proprietarius occidit, legis Aquiliae actioni et ad exhibendum accedit, si possidens proprietarius occidit, ideoque cessat de dolo actio.
If the owner kills a slave who is subject to a right of use, the action under the Lex Aquilia and the action for production are available, if the owner kills him while possessing him, and therefore the action for fraud ceases.
Item si seruum legatum heres ante aditam hereditatem occiderit, quoniam priusquam factus sit legatarii, interemptus est, cessat legis Aquiliae actio: de dolo autem actio, quocumque tempore eum occiderit, cessat, quia ex testamento actio competit.
Likewise, if the heir kills a bequeathed slave before entering upon the inheritance, since he was killed before he became the property of the legatee, the action under the Lex Aquilia ceases; however, the action for fraud ceases, at whatever time he killed him, because the action on the testament is available.
Si quadrupes tua dolo alterius damnum mihi dederit, quaeritur, an de dolo habeam aduersus eum actionem. et placuit mihi, quod Labeo scribit, si dominus quadrupedis non sit soluendo, dari debere de dolo, quamuis si noxae deditio sit secuta, non puto dandam nec in id quod excedit.
If your four-footed animal, through the fraud of another person, has caused damage to me, it is asked whether I have an action for fraud against that person. And I agree with what Labeo writes, that if the owner of the animal is not solvent, the action for fraud ought to be granted, although if a surrender for noxa has followed, I do not think it should be granted, not even for the excess.
Idem Labeo quaerit, si compeditum seruum meum ut fugeret solueris, an de dolo actio danda sit? et ait Quintus apud eum notans: si non misericordia ductus fecisti, furti teneris: si misericordia, in factum actionem dari debere.
The same Labeo asks, if you have released my fettered slave so that he might escape, whether the action for fraud is to be granted? And Quintus, noting on his work, says: if you did not do it led by pity, you are liable for theft; if out of pity, an action on the facts ought to be granted.
Seruus pactionis pro libertate reum domino dedit ea condicione, ut post libertatem transferatur in eum obligatio: manumissus non patitur in se obligationem transferri. Pomponius scribit locum habere de dolo actionem. sed si per patronum stabit, quo minus3 obligatio transferatur, dicendum ait patronum exceptione a reo summouendum. ego moueor: quemadmodum de dolo actio dabitur, cum sit alia actio? nisi forte quis dicat, quoniam exceptione patronus summoueri potest, si agat cum reo, debere dici, quasi nulla actio sit quae exceptione repellitur,4 de dolo decernendam: atquin patronus tunc summouetur, si nolit expromissorem ipsum manumissum accipere. expromissori plane aduersus manumissum dari debebit de dolo: aut si non sit soluendo expromissor, domino dabitur.
A slave, for the sake of an agreement for his freedom, gave a debtor to his master on the condition that after his freedom the obligation should be transferred to himself; once manumitted, he does not allow the obligation to be transferred to himself. Pomponius writes that the action for fraud has place. But if it is due to the patron that the obligation is not transferred, he says it must be held that the patron is to be barred by an exception from the debtor. I am perplexed: how will the action for fraud be granted, when there is another action? Unless perhaps someone should say that, since the patron can be barred by an exception if he sues the debtor, it ought to be said that, as if there is no action which is repelled by an exception, the action for fraud should be decreed; and yet, the patron is only barred if he refuses to accept the manumitted person himself as the expromissor. Clearly, the action for fraud must be given to the expromissor against the manumitted person; or if the expromissor is not solvent, it will be given to the master.
Si dolo malo procurator passus sit uincere aduersarium meum, ut absolueretur, an de dolo mihi actio aduersus eum qui uicit competat, potest quaeri. et puto non competere, si paratus sit reus transferre iudicium sub exceptione hac 'si collusum est': alioquin de dolo actio erit danda, scilicet si cum procuratore agi non possit, quia non esset soluendo.
If a procurator through bad faith has allowed my opponent to win, so that he might be acquitted, it can be asked whether an action for fraud is competent to me against the one who won. And I think it is not competent, if the defendant is prepared to transfer the trial under this exception ‘if there has been collusion’; otherwise, the action for fraud will have to be granted, namely, if it is not possible to sue the procurator, because he is not solvent.
Idem Pomponius refert Caecidianum praetorem non dedisse de dolo actionem aduersus eum, qui adfirmauerat idoneum esse eum, cui mutua pecunia dabatur, quod uerum est: nam nisi ex magna et euidenti calliditate non debet de dolo actio dari.
The same Pomponius reports that the praetor Caecidianus did not grant the action for fraud against one who had affirmed that he to whom the loan of money was given was solvent, which is correct; for unless it is from great and obvious craftiness, the action for fraud ought not to be granted.
- 4.3.7.prsi alia actio non sit
Pomponius interprets the phrase 'if there should be no other action' (the condition of subsidiarity for the action for fraud) in a substantive and reasonable sense, meaning 'if the matter cannot be saved in any other way' for the person concerned.
- 4.3.7.prnec uidetur huic sententiae aduersari, quod Iulianus libro quarto scribit
The grammatical subject of the main clause nec uidetur... aduersari is the noun clause introduced by quod... scribit (what Julian writes). It asserts that Julian's text does not seem to contradict Pomponius's opinion.
- 4.3.7.8si per patronum stabit, quo minus
This is a construction based on the impersonal expression stat per aliquem quo minus... (it is due to someone that ... not / someone is responsible for preventing ...), indicating here a case where the patron is at fault for the failure to transfer the obligation.
- 4.3.7.8quasi nulla actio sit quae exceptione repellitur
A quasi clause with the subjunctive present sit, expressing a legal fiction that an action which can be defeated by an exception is treated 'as if it does not exist.'